Laying Hands on Religious Racketeers: Applying Civil RICO to Fraudulent Religious Solicitation by Turley, Jonathan
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 29 | Issue 3 Article 2
Laying Hands on Religious Racketeers: Applying
Civil RICO to Fraudulent Religious Solicitation
Jonathan Turley
Copyright c 1988 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Jonathan Turley, Laying Hands on Religious Racketeers: Applying Civil RICO to Fraudulent Religious
Solicitation, 29 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 441 (1988), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss3/2
William and Mary
Law Review
VOLUME 29 SPRING 1988 NUMBER 3
LAYING HANDS ON RELIGIOUS RACKETEERS:
APPLYING CIVIL RICO TO FRAUDULENT RELIGIOUS
SOLICITATION
JONATHAN TURLEY*
CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ....................................... 443
II. RELIGIOUS TELEVISION SOLICITATION: SHOULD THE
ELEVENTH COMMANDMENT BE 'CAVEAT EMPTOR'? .. .. . 447
A. General Solicitation Fraud ................... 455
B. Goal-Specific Solicitation Fraud .............. 459
III. PRIVATE AND GOVERNMENTAL REMEDIES FOR RELIGIOUS
FRAUD .......................................... 463
A. Private Enforcement ....................... 465
B. Governmental Enforcement .................. 468
1. The Federal Communications Commission:
"Plugged into Heaven" .................. 468
2. The Internal Revenue Service: Rendering
unto Caesar ............................ 470
3. Political and Practical Problems of Govern-
mental Deterrence ...................... 474
* Federal Judicial Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. J.D.,
Northwestern University School of Law, 1987; B.A., University of Chicago, 1983. I wish to
thank Thomas Eovaldi for his encouragement at various stages of this research. The respon-
sibility, however, for all theories and conclusions in this Article is entirely the author's.
442 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:441
IV. FRAUD AND THE FAITHFUL: SUING RELIGIOUS RACKE-
TEERS UNDER CIVIL RICO AND THE GAINS MULTIPLICA-
TION APPROACH ...................................... 476
A. Civil RICO: Penalty Maximization and the Eco-
nomics of Racketeering ...................... 480
B. Religious Racketeering and the Mechanics of a
Civil RICO Action ........................... 485
C. Substantial Versus Fractional Religious Racke-
teers: Should Society Ruin Them All and Let
God Sort Them Out? .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  488
D. Focused Penalty Maximization: The Gains Mul-
tiplication Approach Applied to Cases of Reli-
gious Racketeering .......................... 490
V. CONCLUSION ........................................ 496
RELIGIOUS RACKETEERS
"Thou shalt not defraud thy neighbor."'
"[I]t happens to all good Christians, to Jesus and Paul and Dr.
Falwell.'
2
I. INTRODUCTION
In one television commercial, an American evangelist in Africa
pulls back a blanket to expose a dead child being cradled in its
mother's arms.3 In another commercial, a charity representative in
Portugal is shown leading five children away from their mother,
who cannot feed them. As the Portuguese mother goes into a
seizure brought on by malnutrition, the church spokesman assures
the television audience that this is not a staged event.4 In another
commercial, a California preacher announces his divinely inspired
"Dare to be Rich" religion that, among other things, guarantees
believers a four-fold return on every dollar given to God-via the
preacher. 5 These are all examples of religious television solicita-
tion, and in the United States this is big business. Every year an
estimated two billion tax-deductible dollars are given to religious
fund raisers.6 Of that sum, $1 billion goes directly to support tele-
vision ministries such as those run by Jerry Falwell, Pat Robert-
son, Jimmy Swaggart, Oral Roberts, and Robert Schuller.7 The re-
maining $1 billion goes to smaller television ministries and an
1. Leviticus 19:13 (King James).
2. Pastor Carl Stevens, leader of The Bible Speaks, after being found guilty of "clerical
deceit, avarice and subjugation" by a federal judge. Fisher, Controversial Church Group
Resettles Near Baltimore, Wash. Post, Sept. 29, 1987, at A10, col 5.
3. See Johnston & Leonard, TV Charities: Let the Giver Beware, L.A. Times, Jan. 20,
1985, at 3, col. 1.
4. Id.
5. See United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 845 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1157 (1982).
6. Ostling, TV's Unholy Row, TiM, Apr. 6, 1987, at 60. Americans give $18 billion to
religious organizations annually. C. BIcAL, CHARrry USA 85 (1979).
7. Johnston & Leonard, supra note 3, at 3. Figures differ radically because of the prolifer-
ation of small television ministries appearing on local television stations. Nevertheless, the
top five televangelists alone account for more than $500 million in annual religious revenue,
mostly from solicitations. See infra note 46. Religious relief organizations receive equally
impressive annual solicitations. One such organization, World Vision, takes in an estimated
$237 million annually. EVANGEOICAL CoUcIL FOR FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY, 1987 MEMBER
REPORT 17 [hereinafter EVANGELICAL COUNCIL REPORT]. See Johnston & Leonard, supra note
3, at 3; Lindsey, Religious Group Facing Inquiries on Ethiopia Aid, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13,
1985, at 14, col. 1.
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assortment of religious fund-raising charities, such as International
Christian Aid, that solicit donations for relief programs and minis-
tries abroad, often in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.'
Every year, potentially hundreds of millions of dollars are lost to
religious fraud." Religious organizations use television to solicit
funds for specific purposes such as African relief without any re-
quirement, or apparently any desire, to verify their use. 10 Many of
the top televangelists" and religious relief organizations 12 have
been accused of major fraudulent solicitation, although little actual
8. International Christian Aid and its president, L. Joe Bass, have repeatedly been ac-
cused of financial improprieties. See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
9. Estimating how much fraudulent solicitation occurs is difficult because few cases are
litigated. Nevertheless, considering the total amount of money involved, the potential num-
bers are staggering. In one solicitation by a Roman Catholic order, $20.4 million was raised
in an 18-month drive for hungry children in Africa, but only $500,000, or less than 3 %, was
actually spent on the missions. Rakay & Sugarman, A Reconsideration of the Religious Ex-
emption: The Need for Financial Disclosure of Religious Fund Raising and Solicitation
Practices, 9 Loy. U. CH. L.J. 863, 864 n.7 (1978). For additional facts on this solicitation
drive, see infra note 92. Other organizations that collect millions of dollars annually have
been accused of diverting the money from the advertised purposes. See infra notes 70-99
and accompanying text.
10. A number of top televangelists solicit funds for missions overseas. For example, Jerry
Falwell at one time raised considerable amounts of funds ostensibly for such missions. In-
ability to account for the spending of these funds has prompted the continual concern of
public interest groups. Woodward, The Churches vs. the State, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 23, 1981, at
78 (discussing Falwell's annual campaigns raising $50 million in unchecked funds).
11. For a discussion of the current top televangelists, see infra notes 33-45 and accompa-
nying text. One expert in the area estimates that half of all televangelists engage in dubious
solicitation techniques. Nightline: PTL Club Scandal Continues (2), at 5 (ABC television
broadcast, Apr. 27, 1987) [hereinafter Nightline] (interview with Paul Roper, Operation
Anti-Christ). Recently, one of the best-known fundamentalist broadcasters, Carl Stevens,
was forced to sell all of his church assets to repay $6.6 million to a contributor. Fisher,
supra note 2, at A10, col. 5. Operating mainly via satellite radio, Stevens ran The Bible
Speaks, a fundamentalist church with 16,000 members in the United States and 23 other
countries. Id. A federal bankruptcy judge found that Stevens had deceived a wealthy devo-
tee into giving him money. In re The Bible Speaks, 73 B.R. 848 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987),
aff'd sub nom The Bible Speaks v. Dovydenas, 81 B.R. 750 (D. Mass. 1988). After selling his
assets, Stevens relocated with an estimated 1,000 followers in Baltimore and has established
an organization called Greater Grace. Fisher, supra note 2, at A12, col. 2. Stevens is some-
what ambiguous regarding his ministry's ethical obligations. When asked recently "whether
he teaches [his followers] that it is permissible to lie, Stevens said only that 'the church has
always had to defend itself against people who are against Jesus Christ. There's no lying
there.'" Id. at A12, col. 4.
12. Religious relief organizations include World Vision and International Christian Aid,
which have both been accused of financial misconduct. See infra notes 95-99 and accompa-
nying text.
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litigation, private or governmental, has ever resulted. Governmen-
tal agencies face a number of legal and political disincentives in
pursuing fraudulent religious solicitation and private citizens have
few incentives for bringing action themselves.
This Article examines the various legal remedies available to
combat religious fraud. Although much of the discussion will focus
on television fraud, specifically top television ministries and reli-
gious relief organizations, the remedy advanced by this Article is
equally applicable to any case of religious fraud regardless of the
medium used for solicitation.1" In particular, the Article considers
the possible use of the Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organiza-
tion (RICO) Act14 in prosecuting religious racketeers. The Article
argues that RICO, designed originally for use in the fight against
organized crime, can be used against religious organizations that
use television to solicit funds fraudulently. In order to facilitate
private suits, Congress set a low standard of proof for the required
"pattern of racketeering," which is itself defined quite liberally.15
In addition, Congress offered RICO plaintiffs a generous incentive
for bringing successful private suits against racketeers-attorney
fees and treble damages.1 ' These and other incentives made civil
RICO a powerful tool for "private attorneys general" and one that
can be applied successfully in the area of religious fraud.
This Article shows why civil RICO promises to be a better deter-
rent than the current private and governmental remedies for reli-
gious fraud. The Article also argues that RICO can be changed to
better deter racketeering in religious programming, by a modifica-
tion in the way damages are measured. Under the current system,
a victim of racketeering is awarded three times the value of the
proven damages, or harm, resulting from a racketeering offense.
This harm-oriented measurement of damages permits some inef-
13. The Article concentrates on the top televangelists and religious relief organizations
because they represent a sizable share of the estimated $2 billion collected each year
through radio and television solicitation. See Ostling, supra note 6, at 60. It is in radio and
television solicitation that the danger of fraud is the greatest and the legal remedies the
fewest. A person defrauded by a ministry in which he or she is active may have a number of
possible contract and tort claims unavailable to a television contributor. See infra notes
112-21 and accompanying text.
14. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982).
15. Id. § 1961(5).
16. Id. § 19164(c).
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fectiveness that could be eliminated by an alternative measure-
ment approach that this Article calls "gains multiplication."
The gains multiplication approach to damages17 would require
trebling a racketeer's gains from racketeering rather than trebling
the harm to the victims. In the religious fraud context, this change
would result in higher damage figures because profits made with
fraudulently solicited funds would be included in the figure to be
trebled. The value in this approach is its differentiation among
racketeers based on their reliance on racketeering proceeds. The
Article shows that the trebling multiplier is most useful in testing
the reliance and thereby the reform potential of racketeering busi-
nesses. Although victims of religious fraud would be well served
under either measure of damages, this Article argues that the gains
multiplication method may be more effective at deterring religious
racketeers who use their ill-gotten gains for even greater profits.
The Article begins with a short overview of the origins and pre-
sent scope of religious fraud in the United States. Part II shows
how religious groups borrowed from secular charities in developing
television appeals and programming. Types of fraud-general so-
licitation fraud and goal-specific fraud-are considered in the con-
text of recent cases of religious fraud. Part III addresses the vari-
ous private and governmental remedies used against religious
fraud. After showing how these remedies have failed to compensate
the victims of religious fraud and to deter future fraudulent prac-
tices, the Article turns to the possible use of RICO by private par-
ties. Part IV discusses the purposes and provisions of civil RICO.
The Article shows how RICO functions to maximize penalties'8 in
awarding damages and thereby ruin racketeering enterprises. After
showing how RICO supplies private parties with the incentive and
the means for suing religious racketeers, the Article considers the
alternative gains multiplication approach. The Article concludes
17. See Turley, The RICO Lottery and the Gains Multiplication Approach: An Alterna-
tive Measurement of Damages Under RICO, 33 VML. L. REv. 239 (1988) (suggesting the
gains multiplication approach to measure civil RICO damages to bring RICO closer to the
antitrust damage structure of the Clayton Act). See infra notes 224-30 and accompanying
text.
18. Penalty maximization, as applied in civil RICO cases, describes a system that works
to drive damages as high as possible in order to force a racketeering business into insol-
vency. See generally Turley, supra note 17 (in which author developed this concept).
[Vol. 29:441
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with an application of the gains multiplication approach to a num-
ber of cases of religious fraud.
II. RELIGIOUS TELEVISION SOLICITATION: SHOULD THE ELEVENTH
COMMANDMENT BE 'CAVEAT EMPTOR'?
In 1951, a New York charity dedicated to fighting cerebral palsy
hit on a novel idea. The charity decided to hold its annual theatri-
cal variety benefit show on television. Broadcasting from Carnegie
Hall, this first "television fund-raising marathon" raised more
money in one evening than the charity had raised the entire previ-
ous year. With that inaugural show, the charity "telethon" was
born.19 Since this first telethon, television has become a financial
bonanza for charitable and religious organizations. The relatively
recent marriage between television and charity fund-raising has
produced what has been called "one of the last great unregulated
financial frontiers in America. '20 It has also produced a whole new
problem for constitutional and administrative law schol-
ars-religious fraud.21 Almost entirely free of any governmental
regulation,22 religious organizations can collect unlimited funds for
purposes ranging from ballooning Bibles over the Iron Curtain23 to
19. Johnston & Leonard, supra note 3, at 3. The first telethon for United Cerebral Palsy
raised $276,408, a sum that, although small by today's standards, was extraordinary at that
time. Id.
20. Id.
21. Only a few articles deal with religious fraud and then often only within the context of
specific litigation or legislation. See Heins, "Other People's Faiths": 'The Scientology Liti-
gation and the Justiciability of Religious Fraud, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 153 (1981); Rakay
& Sugarman, supra note 9; Ryan, The Crumbling Wall Between Church and State: Attor-
ney General Supervision of Religions Corporations in California, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
691 (1982) (discussing attempts, which the author views as unsuccessful, by the California
legislature to regulate religious corporations); Comment, Diversion of Church Funds to Per-
sonal Use: State, Federal and Private Sanctions, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1204 (1982).
22. But cf. CAL. CORP. CODE § 9230 (West Supp. 1987) (authorizing the attorney general to
enforce the specific charitable purpose for which a religious corporation has solicited contri-
butions from the general public). See generally Ryan, supra note 21, at 698-702.
23. Johnston & Leonard, supra note 3, at 3. Rev. Peter Popoff, an ardent anticommunist
minister, solicited funds to buy helium-filled balloons to carry Bibles and religious para-
phernalia over the Iron Curtain. Id. Popoff, a faith healer, attracted national attention re-
cently when a group that investigates religious healers charged that he used a hidden
microphone during videotaping to receive critical information on particular audience mem-
bers-leaving the impression that he was receiving information from a divine source. Dart,
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buying religious books for the starving children of Indonesia.2 4 No
regular official accounting of these donations is required and there
is no legal requirement that religious organizations spend a mini-
mum percentage of donations on the cause advertised.
With Americans spending an estimated $74 billion annually on
charities worldwide, finding God can make extraordinarily good fi-
nancial sense.15 State and federal officials readily admit that reli-
gious fraud is both profitable and virtually risk (and tax) free. "If I
were a con man and wanted to make a lot of money," a California
state official remarked, "I'd set up [a] scam and call it a religion.
Then nobody can look at my books, and if people say I'm a crook,
I'd just say, 'Stay out of my business; you're violating my rights
under the First Amendment!" 6
Religious television solicitation was a natural development after
the tremendous success experienced by secular groups in charity
telethons and fund-raising campaigns. Through early television
charity drives, little-known diseases such as cerebral palsy and
muscular dystrophy became household terms. United Cerebral
Palsy, the fledgling group that launched the first telethon, is now a
major charitable organization with a regular two-day telethon that
grosses close to $20 million.17 Telethons, in fact, have been so suc-
Skeptics' Revelations; Faith Healer Receives 'Heavenly' Messages Via Electronic Receiver,
Debunkers Charge, L.A. Times, May 11, 1986, at, col..
24. United States v. Gering, 716 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1983). For the details of this fraudu-
lent scheme, see infra note 152.
25. Sontag, Assessing How Gifts to Charity Are Used, N.Y. Times, June 29, 1985, at 52,
col. 2 (citing a report by the American Association of Fund Raising Counsel). The broad-
casting ministries have a solid financial base from which to draw support in a country in
which an estimated 50 million people profess having a religious experience. Nightline, supra
note 11, at 6 (interview with Cal Thomas, syndicated journalist). Moreover, a 1984 survey
found that 13.3 million people watch religious shows regularly. Ostling, Power, Glory and
Politics, TImE, Feb. 17, 1986, at 62, 63. This represents 62% of the national audience. Id.
Sixty-one million people spend some time watching these programs each month. Id.
26. Lindsey, Are Some Helping Hands Helping Themselves? N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1985,
at 8E, col. 3 (statement by unidentified California Deputy Attorney General). See also
Johnston & Leonard, supra note 3, at 3. "If you call yourself evangelical-whether you are
or not-and you spend 96 cents of every donated dollar on big salaries, hotel suites, corpo-
rate jets and gold-plated Jeeps and only four cents go to feed people, it is absolutely legal
and there's nothing we can do about it." Id. (quoting Bob Burns, general manager of the Los
Angeles Department of Social Services).
27. Johnston & Leonard, supra note 3, at 3. Today the Cerebral Palsy telethon is one of
the most high-tech productions of any charity. Hosted by John Ritter, CP's "Weekend With
[Vol. 29:441
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cessful that even national governments have turned to television
solicitation. In Argentina, for example, the government arranged a
star-studded telethon to raise money for its war with England over
possession of the Falkland Islands."' Australia produced a similar
government-run telethon to help finance its 1984 Olympic team.29
The potential of television religious programming and solicita-
tion was not lost on religious leaders, particularly evangelical
preachers. Accustomed to traveling from revival meeting to revival
meeting, evangelical preachers saw television as liberating them
from the crude limitations of the revival tent.30 In 1951, Billy Gra-
ham was the first to broadcast a religious program on television.31
In 1961, Pat Robertson established the first Christian television
station. 2 With these ventures, a new term, "televangelist," entered
the language. Since then, television ministries have sprung up on
both the local and national level. The largest of these television
ministries are those featuring the top religious personalities:33 Er-
the Stars" is now an annual event that reaches 100 television stations in the United States
alone. Id.
28. Id. Ironically, in the 1979 movie entitled Americathon, the President of the United
States hosted a telethon to retire the national debt and save the country from bankruptcy.
The actor who played the President was John Ritter, who is now the real host for United
Cerebral Palsy's annual telethon, "Weekend With the Stars." Id.
29. Id. Other unique causes include telethons for a heart transplant, for the legal fees of a
sheriff accused of illegally laundering campaign funds, and for buying balloons to fly Bibles
over the Iron Curtain. Id.
30. Many of the early televised sermons were actually filmed in old revival tents. Minis-
ters commonly referred to today as evangelical were once called "revivalists" because they
travelled across the countryside conducting revival meeting featuring healings and fire-and-
brimstone sermons. These revivalists often worked with local ministers, who received a per-
centage of the collection. The terms "born again" and "being saved" are generally attributed
to these old revival meetings, which were often punctuated with glossolalia, or speaking in
tongues. Sinclair Lewis's book, Elmer Gantry, featured a revivalist and the culture of the
travelling revival show. S. LEwis, ELMER GANmY (1970).
This is not to suggest that television is an exclusively evangelical medium, of course. An
estimated four million households tune into Mother Angelica of the Roman Catholic
Church's Franciscan order. Ostling, supra note 25, at 69. Mother Angelica's Eternal Word
program broadcasts nationally four hours each night. Id.
31. See Ostling, supra note 25, at 62, col. 3. Rex Humbard began a weekly religious pro-
gram two years later. Id.
32. As legend has it, Pat Robertson began his Virginia station, WYAH, with $37,000 and
one camera. Ostling, supra note 25, at 66. This is a trivial sum of money in comparison with
the $233 million that Robertson's network earned in 1985. Id. at 62.
33. The six television ministers with the largest audiences are Pat Robertson (16.3 million
households reached monthly), Jimmy Swaggart (9.3 million), Robert Schuller (7.6 million),
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nest Angley 3 4  Herbert W. Armstrong,"5  Jim Bakker, 6  Paul
Crouch, Richard and Martin De Haan, 8 Jerry Falwell,3 9 Billy
Jim Bakker (5.8 million pre-scandal), Oral Roberts (5.8 million), and Jerry Falwell (5.6 mil-
lion). Id. at 67.
34. Angley is a televangelist who buys time on secular stations, broadcasting from his
ministry in Akron, Ohio. Angley's style comes very close to that of the old-fashioned revival-
ist. He claims special healing powers and conducts healings on television and in revival
meetings, primarily in the Midwest. He relies heavily on television solicitation, often using
numbers from each day's readings to determine the size of the proper donation. Id. at 68-69.
35. Armstrong operated the Worldwide Church of God, a popular California evangelical
ministry. Armstrong broadcasted on both secular and religious stations, usually once a week.
Woodward, supra note 10, at 78. Armstrong was probably the only top televangelist who
stressed apocalyptic messages that foretold the coming of the messiah and thus the end of
the world. The California Attorney General recently took a more mundane interest in that
ministry, attempting to take over financial control of the organization because of allegations
of financial misconduct. See Comment, supra note 21, at 1219.
36. Bakker is the founder of the PTL (Praise The Lord/People That Love) Club. He was
a minister of the Assemblies of God, the largest Pentecostal denomination. Following the
recent scandals regarding his personal and financial affairs, Bakker was stripped of both his
title as a minister with the Assemblies of God and control over the PTL Club. See infra
notes 62-66 and accompanying text. PTL broadcasts daily on its own television station, the
PTL Network, located in Fort Mill, South Carolina, and Charlotte, North Carolina. Ostling,
supra note 6, at 61-62. Bakker has engaged in relief and general solicitations and is cur-
rently under investigation for fraud and financial misconduct. Craig, Falwell quits PTL,
says Bakker may return, The Houston Post., Oct. 9, 1987, at 16A, col. 5.
Bakker built the PTL empire into the largest and most successful religious television min-
istry in the country, with a television program that reached 13.5 million homes daily and
was carried on 178 local stations. Ostling, supra note 6, at 62. PTL also runs Heritage USA,
the nation's third largest amusement park (after the two Disney operations), which includes
a 500-room hotel, a 2500-seat church, a mall with 25 different stores, a 650-seat cafeteria, a
new $100 million re-creation of the Crystal Palace, and a five-acre water park. Bakker, once
thought to be ruined by the recent scandal, appears to be planning a comeback at either
PTL or a new ministry. Craig, supra, at 16A, col. 1 ("Barring a miracle of God, Bakker will
ultimately regain control of PTL") (quoting Falwell).
37. Crouch is a neo-Pentecostalist minister operating out of his California-based Trinity
Broadcasting Network (TBN). Crouch's TBN reaches six million households on cable televi-
sion with a broadcasting budget of $35 million. Ostling, supra note 25, at 67. Crouch has
gained some notoriety for his hard-sell approaches to donations. In one show he reportedly
announced that a widow had donated her life savings to the ministry. Id. Ostling quotes
Crouch as saying, "I'm either the biggest fool and idiot and con man in the world or else I'm
plugged into heaven." Id.
38. The De Haans and their colleague Paul Van Gorder broadcast their Day of Discovery
nondenominational program to 153 cities regularly. Ostling, supra note 25, at 68. With a
1985 budget of $16 million for television broadcasting, this television ministry, based in
Grand Rapids, Michigan, is a growing television force. The De Haans' ministry is more se-
date than that of other televangelists. Id.
39. Probably the best known televangelist, Falwell is a fundamentalist minister who tem-
porarily took control of the PTL empire from Jim Bakker. See supra note 36. Falwell first
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Graham,4 0 D. James Kennedy, 1 Oral Roberts,42 Pat Robertson,43
attracted national attention in 1979 when he formed the Moral Majority, a political action
group dedicated to supporting a conservative political agenda, including stands against
abortion and advocating school prayer. Now renamed the Liberty Federation, Falwell's or-
ganization includes its own Liberty Broadcasting Network, which carries his daily program
(Old Time Gospel Hour, Inc.) to more than 350 TV stations and 1.5 million cable subscrib-
ers. He also heads Liberty University, a fundamentalist college with 7500 students. The
Liberty Federation receives an estimated $100 million annually. Ostling, supra note 6, at 62.
Falwell currently does not use relief solicitation, although he used to raise approximately
$50 million a year for relief programs and missionary work. Woodward, supra note 10, at 69.
Falwell's financial and power base grew enormously when Jim Bakker asked him to take
over PTL. PTL includes its own network, PTL Network, used by a number of other
televangelists. Falwell ultimately withdrew from PTL, but only after bitter public battles
with Bakker, a man he now calls "the greatest scab and cancer ... in the past 2000 years of
the church." Craig, supra note 35, at 16A, col. 2.
40. Graham is the grandfather of all televangelists. Although he no longer has his own
station and broadcasts only occasionally, he still commands an enormous national following.
Graham also carries the distinction of being the only top televangelist who is in good stand-
ing with the Washington-based Evangelical Council for Financial Accountability. Ostling,
supra note 6, at 67.
41. Kennedy runs a 7000-member church in Fort Lauderdale and spends $10 million an-
nually on television broadcasting. Ostling, supra note 34, at 63. A conservative Presbyterian,
Kennedy uses a more traditional religious approach, in sharp contrast to his fellow televi-
sion ministers.
42. Roberts is a charismatic United Methodist preacher, claiming both repeated conversa-
tions with God as well as the power to heal by laying on of hands. For a definition of such
terms as "charismatic," see infra note 78. Roberts began as a revivalist in the 1940s and in
the mid-1950s began to televise his tent revivals. Since then the preacher has assembled an
impressive empire called the City of Faith, which has a reported annual income of $120
million. Located in Tulsa, Oklahoma, the City of Faith includes the 4500-student Oral Rob-
erts University and a new $250-million medical complex. Roberts broadcasts his syndicated
30-minute program on various religious stations. Roberts and his son reach an estimated 5.8
million households monthly. Ostling, supra note 25, at 66.
On January 31, 1987, Roberts announced that God had appeared to him at Roberts's City
of Faith. According to Roberts, God told him that unless he raised $4.5 million by March 31,
1987, God would "call Oral Roberts home." Money came flooding in, and the $4.5-million
demand was met. Roberts has engaged in other questionable solicitation appeals, including a
1980 appeal in which Roberts stated that he was awakened one morning by a 900-foot Jesus
who demanded that Roberts build his $250-million medical center and instructed him to tell
his television audience that through them-and their donations-God would work a miracle.
Ostling, supra note 6, at 63. Both Roberts's viewers and donations have been dropping, with
a loss of 800,000 viewers since 1978. Id. at 66.
43. Robertson, also a candidate for the 1988 Republican presidential nomination, runs the
Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN), which at one time employed Jim Bakker, from his
Virginia Beach, Virginia, ministry. In 1986, CBN's revenues reportedly reached $233 million,
a remarkable figure considering Robertson's beginnings with a $37,000 television station in
Virginia in 1961. Ostling, supra note 25, at 62, 67. Robertson no longer appears regularly on
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Rev. Robert Schuller, 44 W. Eugene Scott,45 and Jimmy Swaggart.46
CBN because of his presidential campaign. The Robertson organization does not conduct
relief solicitation drives, although it does use general television solicitation.
44. Schuller is a television minister operating out of Garden Grove, California. His organi-
zation features the "Crystal Cathedral," a 128-foot structure built for $18 million in 1980,
mainly by private donations. Ostling, supra note 25, at 64. Schuller's weekly religious pro-
gram, Hour of Power, reaches a reported 169 cities on a television budget of $37 million. Id.
Schuller's ministry is renowned for its upbeat messages, as evidenced by the minister's vari-
ous books bearing titles like The Be-Happy Attitudes. Id. Schuller has been accused by a
former aide of falsifying information in relief solicitations. See infra text accompanying note
87.
45. Scott is a charismatic minister who heads the California-based Faith Center Church
of Glendale. For definitions of technical terms like "charismatic" see infra note 78. Scott
used to broadcast on his own channel, Channel 30, but the Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC) withdrew Channel 30's operating license in 1983. See infra notes 118-22 and
accompanying text. Now Scott buys time on other networks. Johnston & Leonard, supra
note 3, at 3, col. 1. The FCC brought but failed to prove charges of fraud and financial
misconduct against Scott. A number of Scott's former associates, however, came forward to
give testimony against the minister. See Scott v. Rosenberg, 702 F.2d 1263, 1266 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1078 (1983).
46. A Pentecostal minister of the Assembly of God, Swaggart is probably one of the most
controversial televangelists. He attracted national attention through his role in exposing the
sexual misconduct of fellow Assembly of God minister Jim Bakker. Bakker and Swaggart
are often viewed as polar extremes in style and message. Swaggart has never hidden his
dissatisfaction with Bakker's Christian theme park, Heritage USA, and PTL's slick televi-
sion operation. Swaggart is more of a traditional revivalist in character and philosophy. Cen-
tered in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Swaggart appears nationally on the PTL Network, al-
though Bakker has on a number of occasions barred Swaggart. Swaggart has drawn a great
deal of criticism for anti-Catholic and antisemitic remarks. Ostling, supra note 6, at 63.
Jimmy Swaggart Ministries grossed an estimated $140 million in 1986. See Applebome,
Scandal Spurs Interest in Swaggart Finances, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1988 at 10, col. 2.
Swaggart's Baton Rouge operation consists of a 270-acre complex, a new Bible college, a
15,000-square-foot printing and distribution center, a full television studio, and a separate
radio recording studio. Ostling, supra note 6, at 63. Swaggart is currently the most active in
missionary work, particularly in Latin America. Ostling, Offering the Hope of Heaven, TME,
Mar. 16, 1987, at 69. Swaggart claims to have spent $8 million in El Salvador and Costa Rica
alone. His popularity in Latin American countries, moreover, is growing with his invest-
ments. On a recent tour of Latin America, Swaggart filled Santiago's 80,000-seat National
Stadium. Id.
Swaggart recently stepped down from Swaggart Ministries after revelations that he peri-
odically employed prostitutes to perform immoral acts. Woodward, The Wages of Sin,
NEWSWEEK, Mar. 7, 1988, at 51, 51. Swaggart was reportedly implicated by photographs
supplied by evangelist Marvin Gorman, who was once a nationally known Assemblies of God
minister before being defrocked (with Swaggart's support) after a similar sex scandal. Ost-
ling,, Now It's Jimmy's Turn, TiME, Mar, 7. 1988, at 46, 48. On April 8, 1988, the Assem-
blies of God church elders defrocked Swaggart for rejecting punishment, including a one-
year suspension from preaching. Church Defrocks Swaggart for Rejecting Its Punishment,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1988, at 1, col. 2-3.
RELIGIOUS RACKETEERS
The top televangelists alone account for more than $1 billion in
annual contributions. 7
Top television ministries often employ many of the gimmicks
and sales tactics used in regular advertising campaigns. A former
director of National Charities Information Bureau, a charity
watchdog group, studied the solicitation techniques used in reli-
gious advertising and objected to the use of slick commercial
pitches. "It's a hype, a pitch," he stated, "and they are doing a
selling job, just the way car manufacturers are when they put some
sexy person on an automobile hood and say 'buy this car.' ",48 Often
large television ministries will "mine" an audience for new donors
by encouraging people to write in for material or free gifts.49 Once
these viewers send in their addresses, the ministry adds them to
their mailing lists. People are more likely to donate money if their
first interaction with a ministry is a free gift or pamphlet. More-
over, the one person in a hundred who does give money in a televi-
sion appeal will give money again sixty-five to seventy-five percent
of the time.50 Jerry Falwell can be seen regularly offering the faith-
ful a free stamp-sized piece of celluloid containing the entire Bible,
printed in microscopic type. Robert Schuller does the same with an
offer of a free bracelet. Most of the top ministries follow suit with
pamphlets and gifts designed to induce people to send in their
names and addresses. 51
47. Nightline, supra note 11, at 6 (interview with Frosty Troy, Editor, Oklahoma Ob-
server). The remaining televangelists collect an estimated $1.5 billion. Id. Almost $500 mil-
lion in annual contributions can be tied to five of the top televangelists. According to the
Evangelical Council for Financial Accountability, Billy Graham, who does not have a regular
television ministry, raises around $64.5 million in donations annually. EVANGELICAL COUNCiL
REPORT, supra note 7, at 1. Before his recent difficulties, Jim Bakker raised roughly $129
million annually in contributions and profits from his various PTL enterprises. Ostling,
supra note 6, at 60. Jerry Falwell reportedly generates $100 million a year and Oral Roberts
raises roughly $80 million. Id. at 62-63. In 1986, Jimmy Swaggart's organization raised $140
million. Id. at 63.
48. Johnston & Leonard, supra note 3, at 3, col. 1. "They aren't saying anything about
the quality of the car, what's under the hood; they are selling by glamorizing the product."
Id. (statement by M.C. Van de Worken, former executive director of the National Charities
Information Bureau).
49. Id. "Many appeals you see on television are, in effect, prospecting for their direct mail
operation. They are literally mining the TV audience to find new contributors." Id. (state-
ment by Tom Belford, Vanguard Communications).
50. Id.
51. Id.
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Televangelists have also borrowed heavily from secular medical
charity advertising.52 Secular charities, particularly the Muscular
Dystrophy Association (MDA), have perfected the "pity approach"
used extensively in religious relief commercials. For example, in
1981 Jerry Lewis's Labor Day Telethon was criticized for its use of
graphic, sometimes misleading pictures of children suffering from
muscular dystrophy.53 Advocate groups for the handicapped ob-
jected to MDA's depiction of people with muscular dystrophy as
"childlike, helpless, hopeless, nonfunctioning and noncontributing
members of society. '54 MDA responded by changing its 1982 tele-
thon format to include pictures of adults with muscular dystrophy.
The result was a sharp drop in donations during the telethon, and
not until two years later, after MDA returned to the earlier format,
did donations begin to rise again to the 1981 levels.5
Like their secular counterparts, most of the top television
preachers conduct massive fund-raising drives on behalf of mis-
sionary work and famine relief in the Third World. These cam-
paigns are often characterized by graphic pictures and urgent calls
for help. The commercials at times personalize aid by asking for
donations to help a specific child.56 Maurice Mosley, the head of
52. Id. "Many charities see the great success of Muscular Dystrophy, Easter Seals and
Cerebral Palsy and say 'let's do it."' Id. (statement by Harold Hoffman, president of Thea-
ter Authority, an entertainers' union coalition).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. "They went backwards, from pity to bad.... There appeared to be no attempt to
present disabled people as active in society or having control over their own lives." Id.
(statement of Evan Kemp, executive director of the Disability Rights Center).
56. World Vision, the nation's top relief organization in contributions, uses this method to
help generate more than $237 million in contributions annually. EVANGELICAL COUNCIL RE-
PORT, supra note 7, at 17. See also Johnston & Leonard, supra note 3, at 3, col. 1 (reporting
World Vision's profits in 1984-1985 as $128 million). Under World Vision's Child Care Part-
nership Program, contributors normally give a monthly donation of $14 to $18 to support a
specific child. They receive a picture of the child and get occasional letters from the child.
Actually, however, hundreds of contributors are receiving the same pictures and letters.
Johnston & Leonard, supra note 3, at 3, col. 1. For a discussion of potential contracts reme-
dies for contributors to the Child Care Partnership Program, see infra note 116. Jerry
Falwell once solicited over $50 million a year for relief organizations, often using personal-
ized appeals. In one case, he showed a picture of Vietnamese boat people in desperate condi-
tions. Falwell made an urgent appeal to help the refugees, though the picture actually had
been taken a year before. At least $4 million reportedly was raised, of which only $350,000
went to boat refugees. Nightline, supra note 11, at 3-4.
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Priority One International, a Texas-based relief organization, takes
special care to dramatize scenes of suffering in his solicitation
drives. After unwrapping a dead child in one scene, Mosley turned
to the camera and said, "Don't wait. . . . Last night, 40,000 peo-
ple died. ' 57 World Vision, the current champion of relief solicita-
tion with $237 million in donations annually, uses similar tactics.
World Vision's studio backdrop is a stage set with clocks. Viewers
are asked every three minutes to donate now because "time is run-
ning out."58
These state-of-the-art commercials seem to adhere to the rule
that a charity can rarely be graphic enough. Joseph Campanella,
host of International Christian Aid (ICA), knows this rule well.
When filming a spot featuring five children being given up by their
starving mother, Campanella was careful to remind the audience
that the scene was not staged. When the sick mother fell into a
convulsive seizure, he filmed her suffering as he flashed a toll-free
number on the screen.59 Spots of this sort enabled ICA, which is
now under investigation for possible fraudulent practices, to gross
more than $33 million in 1983. 0
A. General Solicitation Fraud
All religious fraud can be condensed into a breach of a single
promise. In soliciting funds, a television ministry or religious group
holds itself out as a certain kind of organization, performing a ser-
vice or following a belief that the viewer should support. A reli-
gious advertisement makes an implicit promise that it is soliciting
funds for the purposes mentioned or alluded to in the commercial
and not for any hidden agenda. Television solicitations can be ei-
ther general or specific in nature. General solicitation involves fund
raising for the support of the ministry itself. This type of solicita-
tion is analogous to the neighborhood Sunday collection plate.
57. Johnston & Leonard, supra note 3, at 3, col. 1. Established in 1980, Priority One
International is a relatively young evangelical ministry with an annual income of roughly $1
million, all of which comes from contributions. EVANGELCAL COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 7,
at 139. Priority One has its own nationally syndicated television specials and claims to have
missions in twenty countries. Id.
58. Johnston & Leonard, supra note 3, at 3, col. 1.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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Some preachers stress continual monthly pledges to finance their
ministry.8 1 Others use numbers from the daily scripture reading to
determine that day's desired contributions. 2 Regardless of the tac-
tic used, however, general solicitations make no specific promises
about how the money will be spent, beyond stating that it will be
used to support the ministry.
Fraudulent general solicitation can involve either the use of do-
nations for purposes outside the proper functioning of the ministry
or the simple misrepresentation of the ministry itself. The former
type of fraud, involving the improper use of church funds, is often
publicized in scandals disclosing extravagant spending by religious
leaders or their organizations.63 Allegations of this type of fraud
have been made against Jim and Tammy Bakker, the dethroned
hosts of the popular PTL show.6 4 The Bakkers used their televi-
sion ministry to assemble the $129-million-a-year PTL empire. 5
PTL was rocked by a series of charges involving Jim Bakker's al-
leged heterosexual and homosexual trysts. In one case, PTL alleg-
edly paid more than $265,000 in church funds to suppress the epi-
sode before it became public.6 New evidence also suggests that the
Bakkers received $4.8 million in salary from 1984 to 1986 despite
61. Some ministers demand something more substantial. Kenneth Copeland, head of Fort
Worth's Eagle Mountain Chapel, reportedly asks viewers to donate a tenth of their annual
income, an approach used by some top television ministries. Ostling, supra note 25, at 69.
Ostling quotes Copeland responding to the question of tithing by saying, "Yes, yes, yes! A
thousand times yes! I want to get healed. I want to get well. I want to get money. I want to
get prosperous!" Id.
62. Ernest Angley often employs this type of solicitation. See supra note 34. Jim Bakker's
PTL Club used a variety of solicitation methods, including its very successful "lifetime part-
ner" program. Under this program, PTL followers could donate $1000 in exchange for three
nights free lodging every year for life at PTL's Christian theme park, Heritage U.S.A. Craig,
supra note 36, at 16A, col. 4. Approximately 120,000 people signed on to the program, far in
excess of what Heritage U.S.A. could reasonably handle. Ostling, Enterprising Evangelism,
TIME, Aug. 3, 1987, at 52. The ministry raised $108 million through this program. Id.
63. This Article concentrates on the use of church funds for personal enrichment as a
problem of fraudulent solicitation rather than one of embezzlement or financial misconduct.
The promise that money will go to a ministry or for a religious purpose serves as the basis of
the fraudulent predicate acts under civil RICO. See infra notes 192-96 and accompanying
text.
64. Ostling, supra note 6, at 60.
65. Id. at 62.
66. Id. at 62-63. See also The Jessica Hahn Story, PLAYBOY, Nov. 1987, at 83 (interview
with Jessica Hahn discussing her dealings with PTL to receive the $265,000); Nightline,
supra note 11, at 4.
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Bakker's assurances to his viewers in 1985 that his net worth a few
years earlier "came out to be 15,000. ''e7 While at PTL, the Bakkers
also purchased "$700,000 worth of real estate and luxury cars, in-
cluding a $404,000 home."88
Other top preachers face similar charges of misusing church
funds. Oral Roberts, for example, who has a syndicated thirty-min-
ute program that reaches 210 stations and raises an estimated $88
million a year, has come under attack for using church funds to
buy such items as a $2.5-million home in Beverly Hills. 9 Neverthe-
less, these types of transactions are different from embezzlement of
church funds.70 Instead these cases involve uses of church funds
that are known and condoned by church leaders, though often
these leaders are loyal followers or even family members of the
televangelist.71
67. Brand, An "Outrageous" Ministry, Tuam, May 4, 1987, at 82 (noting also that Bak-
ker's former aide, Richard Dortch, received $350,000 in salary in 1986).
68. Ostling, supra note 6, at 64. The Bakkers have been accused by another televangelist,
John Ankerberg, of "diversion of funds." Brand, supra note 67, at 82. The Bakkers' assets
reportedly include four condominiums, homes in California and Tennessee, and two Merce-
des-Benz automobiles. Watson, Heaven Can Wait, NEWSWEEK, June 8, 1987, at 59.
69. Nightline, supra note 11, at 5 (interview with Paul Roper of Operation Anti-Christ).
Oral Roberts's home is actually in his church's name, although this legal distinction has
been challenged by a leading watchdog group in the area. Id. Other television ministers have
similar arrangements. Pat Robertson, for example, lives in a church-owned $420,000 man-
sion. Ostling, supra note 25, at 65.
70. A number of leading ministers have been prosecuted as embezzlers for diverting
church funds into secret or personal accounts. A good example is Father Carcich of the
Pallotine Fathers of Baltimore, who pleaded guilty to, among other things, diverting relief
funds into private bank accounts. See infra note 85. Similar charges have been made in
cases such as that involving the Worldwide Church of God, in which members alleged that
church leaders were diverting huge sums of money for personal use. Lauter, Are Churches
Under Attack?, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 2, 1981, at 1, col. 1. See Worldwide Church of God, Inc. v.
California, 623 F.2d 613, 614 (9th Cir. 1980); Comment, supra note 21, at 1219. The leaders
of International Christian Aid have been accused of diverting money to Swiss bank ac-
counts. Lindsey, Religious Group Facing Inquiries On Ethiopia Aid, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13,
1985, at L14, col. 1. See also Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 412 F.2d
1197 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1009 (1970) (holding that the founder of a church
is not entitled to income tax exemption because a portion of the earnings was diverted for
his personal enrichment).
71. The PTL controversy increased public scrutiny of the use of church funds for the
personal benefit of a minister. In addition to a salary that reached $638,112 in 1983, Jim
Bakker enjoyed a $390,000 condominium in Highland Beach, Florida, among other church-
supplied perks. Ostling, supra note 62, at 52. The condominium was also furnished by PTL
at a cost of $202,566. Id. Reportedly, Jim Bakker also received more direct financial assis-
tance, such as a $76,000 interest-free loan from PTL. Id.
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Another form of general solicitation fraud occurs when contribu-
tions are solicited for a ministry that is a sham or substantially
different from what it purports to be in its television spots. A good
example of this type of fraud is the now-defunct Church of Ha-
keem.7 2 Headed by Hakeem Abdul Rasheed (a.k.a. Clifford Jones),
the Church of Hakeem advanced the belief that material desires
could be achieved through introspection and faith in God. A cen-
tral tenet of the Church of Hakeem was "the law of increase, or the
law or cosmic abundance, which provided that if one gave freely
one would receive returns greater than the initial gift. 7 3 The
Church began a "Dare to be Rich" program that promised contrib-
utors an "increase of God" amounting to four times their dona-
tions.74 God, the Church promised, would give contributors four-
fold their money at rates calibrated to the amount of their dona-
tion. For example, a donation of $249 would be increased in 70
days whereas a donation of $1,000,000 would take God at least
three years to increase.75 These cycles, Rasheed explained, were
tied to different levels of consciousness, the lower figure represent-
ing a level of consciousness that had transcended greed and thus
could be increased sooner.
The IRS had another explanation. It identified the "Dare to be
Rich" program as simply a "ponzi" or pyramid scheme. Instead of
investing with divine supervision as he promised, Rasheed would
actually give contributors four-fold their money by shifting funds
Other televangelists also reportedly use their ministries for personal loans. One report on
Jimmy Swaggart found that in 1985 the minister borrowed $2 million from his organization
to build "three luxurious homes." Id. at 53. Such loans are particularly problematic in cases
like the Swaggart ministry, in which the 1986 board was supposedly composed of "himself,
Wife Frances, Son Donnie, Daughter-in-Law Debbie, Ministry Lawyer William Treeby and
four clergy chums." Id. See Applebome, supra note 46, at 10, col. 1 (Swaggart Ministries run
like "mom and pop shop").
72. See United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1981).
73. Id. at 845.
74. Id. Oral Roberts has at times used a similar approach in his "Seed-Faith" messages.
Roberts tells his followers that donations to God, through Roberts, will be repaid financially
as well as spiritually. Galloway, Worldliness or Godliness, Chicago Tribune, June 21, 1987,
§ 5, at 7. As biblical support for this promise, Roberts cites 2 Corinthians 9:6, in which Paul
assures Christians that those who bountifully sow their seeds shall "reap also bountifully."
Id.
75. Rasheed, 663 F.2d at 846.
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around.7 6 Early donors with smaller contributions, therefore, re-
ceived part of the money Rasheed was receiving from later contrib-
utors. In the meantime, he bought a number of strictly earthly pos-
sessions, including a $900,000 yacht and a $100,000 Rolls Royce.7
The Church of Hakeem is an example of fraudulent general solici-
tation because contributors were led to believe that Rasheed was
investing their money and that the increases were the result of di-
vinely guided investment.
B. Goal-Specific Solicitation Fraud
Fraud also occurs with funds raised for a specific stated goal of
the ministry.7 8 This goal can range from money for a new television
antenna to, in the most extreme case, paying God's stated price for
letting a minister live.79 In the last decade, however, a particular
kind of goal-specific solicitation has become commonplace in tele-
vision ministries and solicitations. Religious organizations, particu-
larly fundamentalist, evangelical, and Pentecostal ministries,"
have organized drives for missions and relief projects abroad. Most
of the top televangelists raise funds specifically for work in Africa,
76. Id. at 849.
77. Id. at 846.
78. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
79. The latter example involved Oral Roberts's 1987 $4.5-million fund drive. According to
Roberts, God would end Roberts's life unless his viewers came up with the money within a
certain period of time. See supra note 42. Interestingly, the owner of a dog racetrack gave
Roberts the final $1.3 million at the last minute. This gift enraged many evangelicals. The
racetrack owner insisted that he gave the money to keep Roberts from committing "hara-
kiri" and suggested that the preacher seek "psychiatric treatment." Ostling, supra note 6, at
67.
80. "Evangelical" is a term often used to describe all protestants who follow a traditional,
often conservative doctrine. Evangelicals emphasize individual commitment to God and
mission work. "Fundamentalists" are evangelicals who take the Bible literally and usually
espouse a militant obedience to God. Jerry Falwell is a fundamentalist. "Pentecostal" de-
scribes an evangelical or fundamentalist who believes in the physical manifestation of the
Holy Spirit through such things as glossolalia, or speaking in tongues. Jimmy Swaggart and
Jim Bakker are Pentecostals. Ostling, supra note 6, at 60. One of the largest Pentecostal
organizations is the Assemblies of God, which recently defrocked Bakker following allega-
tions of his involvement in a sex scandal. Hull, The Rise and Fall of "Holy Joe," 'I'E, Aug.
3, 1987, at 54, 55. A "charismatic" is any non-Pentecostal who believes in glossolalia and
other forms of physical manifestation. Oral Roberts is a charismatic, as are some people
from mainline churches such as the Roman Catholic Church. See also Galloway, supra note
74, § 5, at 7.
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Latin America, and parts of Asia. Other large protestant and main-
line churches have similar mission and relief programs. Most of
these relief programs are legitimate and send the bulk of their con-
tributions to the programs and missions advertised."' Last year, a
record 67,242 American protestants took part in missions abroad,
financed by an estimated $1.3 billion in donations.8 2
Televangelists became deeply involved in relief drives in the
early 1970s. Of the top televangelists, Jimmy Swaggart is probably
the most active in missionary work.8 3 Swaggart claims to have
spent more than $8 million in El Salvador and Costa Rica alone
and makes frequent (and popular) trips to Latin America.84 Al-
though the televangelists insist that they are sending relief dona-
tions to their advertised destination, there is no way of confirming
these statements. Only one top televangelist, Billy Graham, regu-
larly discloses financial records to the Evangelical Council for Fi-
nancial Accountability (EFCA), the leading monitoring group for
televangelists.8 5 Moreover, top evangelists and religious relief orga-
nizations are increasingly being accused of diverting donations
from their advertised use or sending only a small fraction of the
donations received. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, for example, has
been accused of diverting funds raised to feed hungry children.8
Likewise, Jerry Falwell has been accused of raising $6 million for
refugees in northern Thailand but sending only $150,0000 to the
refugees.8 7 Tens of millions of dollars raised through relief drives
81. Wilson, Charity Scandals: "Self-Policing Can't Work," Wash. Post, Jan. 10, 1978, at
A19, col. 1.
82. Ostling, Protestantism's Foreign Legion, TimE, Feb. 16, 1987, at 62. The largest prot-
estant mission program is run by the Southern Baptist Convention. In 1987, 39,309 protes-
tants were engaged in long-term mission commitments and an additional 27,933 protestants
were involved in short-term mission commitments. In comparison, the Roman Catholic
Church sponsors only 9124 missionaries. Id.
83. Ostling, supra note 46, at 69.
84. Id.
85. EVANGELICAL COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 7, at 1. World Vision also makes annual
disclosures to EFCA. Id. at 17. Another organization the National Religious Broadcasters
Association (NRBA), recently released new financial disclosure rules for religious broadcast-
ers. Klott, TV Ministers Dispute Need for Tighter Regulation, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1987, at
9, col. 4. Twenty-five percent of religious broadcasters, however, are not members of the
NRBA. Id.
86. Applebome, supra note 46, at 10, col. 1.
87. Nightline, supra note 11, at 3 (statement of Dr. Michael Korpi, former Falwell
cameraman).
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may have been siphoned off for use in other areas of various minis-
tries, and in some cases, organizations may simply have failed to
send any of the relief donations abroad."8
Moreover, when abuse does occur it is not always committed by
fringe or evangelical groups. One of the more substantial cases of
deceptive relief solicitation involved the Roman Catholic Church.
In 1974 and 1975, the Pallotine Fathers of Baltimore raised $20
million in contributions to be used to support Pallotine missions in
underdeveloped countries around the world. In 1976, however, it
was disclosed that the Pallotine Order had spent less than four
cents of every dollar on its missionary work.89
Several other top televangelists have been accused of diverting
relief donations. Jim and Tammy Bakker are currently under in-
vestigation for possible diversion of church funds for personal or
unadvertised uses.90 Robert Schuller has been accused of similar
deceptive practices, including the use of blatantly false advertising.
A few years ago, Schuller began a campaign for helping the spiritu-
ally and physically starved people of China. Schuller's organization
published a letter from the minister standing in front of the Great
88. Although prosecutions are rare, diversion cases are occasionally litigated. See infra
note 152. Often, questions of diversion are raised simply by ambiguous or misleading solici-
tations. The former appears to have occurred in at least one Feed The Children program.
During one television drive, viewers were exposed to a litany of horrible pictures and urgent
appeals for contributions. In contrast, viewers reportedly did not get a great deal of expo-
sure to the organization itself, which is part of the Larry Jones Evangelistic Association.
Sontag, supra note 25, at 52, col. 2. According to reports on Feed The Children, only 31% of
the contributions went to "child care," whereas at least some of the money went toward
"relief, development evangelism," and "education programs." Id.
89. Wilson, supra note 81, at A19, col. 1. See Rakay & Sugarman, supra note 9, at 864
n.7. The Order solicited the funds through the use of a sophisticated mail campaign that
showed pictures of starving children. The campaign lasted for eight months. The head of
the charity drive, Very Reverend Guido Carcich, pleaded guilty to mishandling $2.2 million
of the funds raised for the benefit of overseas missions and was sentenced to 18 months
probation. Carcich used the money for business deals, loans, and even gifts to friends. One
such gift of $42,000 was diverted to then Governor of Maryland, Marvin Mandel, to help
pay for Mandel's divorce settlement. Weeding Out Clergymen Who Go Astray, US. NEws &
WORLD REP., Oct. 2, 1978, at 63.
Another Catholic priest faced similar charges in Boston. Monsignor Walter Leach solic-
ited $1.3 million under a fictitious organization called the Swedish Mission Fund. Id. at 64.
In yet another case, the late Cardinal John Patrick Cody of Chicago was investigated for
diverting church funds, including making gifts to a long-time friend. Lauter, supra note 70,
at 16, col. 2.
90. Craig, supra note 36, at 16A, col. 2.
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Wall of China. Schuller praised his supporters for sending him to
China and encouraged them to continue to help the relief program.
He stated that he had had a number of highly successful meetings
with Chinese "personalities" whose names were supposedly kept
confidential to protect them from persecution. However, an aide to
Schuller during the drive, which raised $1.6 million, recently re-
vealed that Schuller had actually composed the letter in the aide's
living room in the United States, and that the picture of Schuller
at the Great Wall was taken in a studio in the United States.9
Similar charges have been leveled at other leading televange-
lists92 and relief organizations such as International Christian Aid
(ICA) and World Vision. World Vision, the largest Christian televi-
sion fund-raising organization, repeatedly has been accused of
making misleading solicitations and employing suspect accounting
practices.93 With $237 million in annual donations, World Vision
has started a number of subsidiary groups, such as Black American
Response to the African Crisis, that reportedly are simply fronts
for the main organization.9 4 World Vision has even used the pro-
grams of other relief organizations to generate contributions for its
own organization.95 ICA has come under attack as well. In 1984,
91. Nightline, supra note 11, at 3 (interview with Reverend Timothy Waisanen, former
Schuller aide). In his letter, Schuller wrote, "I am writing to you today from Peking, China.
The Impossibility Thinkers were wrong. I am here! I cannot give you any details of my
conversations with the leading Chinese personalities. I must honor their privacy." Id. (em-
phasis in original). Waisanen stated that he watched Schuller dictate this letter in his Or-
ange, California, living room. Id.
92. According to some reports, the government remains interested in one recent goal-spe-
cific solicitation drive by the Bakkers. In 1986, the Bakkers conducted a one-month drive
for funds to build a home for handicapped children. Although $3 million was raised for the
home (Kevin's House), "[tioday only two youngsters live there." Ostling, supra note 60, at
52.
93. Johnston & Leonard, supra note 3, at 3, col. 1. World Vision was established in 1950
by Dr. Robert Pierce to provide care for Korean orphans. The organization last reported an
income of $237 million, of which $236 million came from donations. EVANGELICAL COUNCIL
REPORT, supra note 7, at 17.
94. Johnston & Leonard, supra note 3.
95. In early 1980, Operation California, a California relief organization, aired a three-hour
telethon featuring various musical acts. At the end of the program, Operation California
made a 17-second appeal for donations. Immediately following that appeal, however, World
Vision aired its own toll-free number for contributions. Many viewers mistakenly sent
money to that number rather than to Operation California. Recently, Stanley S. Mooney-
ham, President of World Vision, gave Operation California a $250,000 donation to end the
matter. Johnston & Leonard, supra note 3, at 3, col. 1.
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ICA ran forty-nine commercials on Cable News Network appealing
for donations to help its relief efforts in Ethiopia.9 There is no
evidence, however, of any ICA program in Ethiopia.9
The State Department claims that both ICA and World Vision
systematically overstate the gravity of the situation in particular
countries during their programming."8 Yet because of their quasi-
religious character, these organizations, like those of the televange-
lists, are left largely unregulated. As the next section will show,
past private and governmental court action against fraudulent reli-
gious organizations has largely been ineffectual for legal as well as
political reasons.
III. PRIVATE AND GOVERNMENTAL REMEDIES FOR RELIGIOUS FRAUD
The potential rewards for defrauding the faithful are great and
the disincentives few. Because of the country's tradition of reli-
gious freedom, religious organizations are the least regulated cor-
porations in our society. Public and judicial opposition to govern-
mental interference with religious organizations has remained
consistently high ever since Thomas Jefferson called for "a wall of
separation between church and state.""9
Past attempts by states to curb fraudulent or deceptive religious
practices have faced opposition in both the courts and the legisla-
tures. Although the Supreme Court has refused to let religious or-
ganizations hide behind the first amendment to avoid "punishment
of acts inimical to the peace, good order and morals of society,"1 0
96. Id.
97. ICA raised millions of dollars for children in East Africa. When asked about their
program, ICA officials claimed that they had worked through a French organization, Doctors
Without Borders. Doctors Without Borders insists, however, that ICA has never sent it "one
centime" for aid. Lindsey, supra note 68, at L14.
98. Johnston & Leonard, supra note 3, at 3, col. 1. Arthur Dewey, head of the State De-
partment's Bureau of Refugee Affairs, called in the ICA spokesmen to ask that the organiza-
tion stop broadcasting out-of-date figures and misleading stories on the situation in some
African countries. According to Mr. Dewey, ICA's representatives responded by accusing
him of being "soft on communism." Id.
99. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (quoting Thomas Jefferson's state-
ment to the Danbury Baptist Association).
100. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890). The Court also stated, "However free the
exercise of religion may be, it must be subordinate to the criminal laws of the country,
passed with reference to actions regarded by general consent as properly the subjects of
punitive legislation." Id. at 342-43. More recently, the Court has noted:
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it has traditionally taken a dim view of state regulation of reli-
gion.1°1 The Court has been particularly responsive to claims by
religious groups that state regulation of solicitation favors one reli-
gion or type of religion over another. Such was the case in Larson
v. Valente,102 in which the Court struck down a Minnesota statute
that placed mandatory reporting requirements on religious organi-
zations. Under the law, religious organizations were required to
register with the state and report their annual collection and ad-
ministration of all contributions.10 3 The purpose of the statute was
to protect against fraudulent practices in the solicitation of contri-
butions.10 4 In drafting the statute, however, the Minnesota legisla-
ture expressly exempted all religious organizations that received
more than half of their total contributions from members or affili-
ated organizations. 0 5 The Holy Spirit Association for the Unifica-
tion of World Christianity (Unification Church) challenged this
fifty-percent rule. Led by Reverend Sun Myung Moon, the Unifica-
tion Church charged that one of its central forms of religious ex-
pression was "door-to-door and public-place proselytizing and so-
licitation of funds to support the Church."'0 6 The Court agreed
and held that the Minnesota statute favored mainline churches
Nothing we have said is intended even remotely to imply that, under the
cloak of religion, persons may, with impunity, commit frauds upon the public.
Certainly penal laws are available to punish such conduct. Even the exercise of
religion may be at some slight inconvenience in order that the State may pro-
tect its citizens from injury. Without doubt a State may protect its citizens
from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in the community, before
permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to establish his iden-
tify and his authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940).
101. The Court has long held that a state can forbid a religious activity only when it
"posels] some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order." Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 403 (1963); see also Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (mandatory reporting
of contributions for religious organizations receiving more than 50% of their contributions
from nonmembers struck down as unconstitutional).
102. 456 U.S. 228 (1984). See Greenhouse, Rule on Fund Raising by Sects Is Overturned
by High Court, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1982, at D23, col. 1.
103. Larson, 456 U.S. at 230-31.
104. Id. at 231.
105. Id. at 230-232.
106. Id. at 234.
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and thus violated the establishment clause of the first
amendment.107
Although the holding in Larson does not bar future nondiscrimi-
natory state reporting requirements, such state regulation would
be highly controversial at the state and local levels. California's at-
torney general's office can attest to this fact after its unsuccessful
suit against the Worldwide Church of God.108 In 1977, the Califor-
nia Attorney General brought charges against the church on behalf
of six church members .who alleged that large sums of church funds
were being diverted by church leaders for personal benefit. After
the charges were made public, a statewide petition drive was
launched to enact legislation barring such suits. The California leg-
islature bowed to public pressure and prohibited future suits of
that kind.109 In passing the bill, one state legislator explained that
"[i]f we have a choice of keeping the state out of the legitimate
affairs of churches, or to let some charlatans get away with fraud,
I'd rather do the latter." 0
Without state mandatory reporting laws and civil remedies for
religious fraud, citizens and government officials must rely on ex-
isting legal sanctions from collateral areas such as tax, federal li-
censing, and mail fraud statutes. Although use of these sanctions
has met with some success, their limited usefulness in combating
religious fraud is easily apparent.
A. Private Enforcement
Few cases involve private action against religious organizations
for deceptive or fraudulent solicitation. The so-called "Scientology
cases" are probably the best known private actions against a reli-
gious group."' These cases involved former devotees of L. Ron
107. Id. at 255.
108. Worldwide Church of God, Inc. v. California, 623 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1980).
109. Lauter, supra note 70, at 16, col. 2; see Briggs, Churches Convene to Curb Regula-
tion, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1981, at 25, col. 1.
110. Lindsey, Can California Control Sham Religious Sects? And Should It?, N.Y. Times,
July 20, 1980, at 22, col. 1.
111. See, e.g., Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125 (D. Mass.
1982); Church of Scientology, Inc. v. Garritano, No. 40906 (Mass. Super. Ct. Suffolk County
July 14, 1980) (dismissing counterclaim in part); Troy v. Church of Scientology, Inc., No.
41073 (Mass. Super. Ct. Suffolk County filed Apr. 2, 1980); Hansen v. Church of
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Hubbard, the founder of Scientology, or Dianetics. Scientology is
based in part on a practice called auditing, a process during which
a member talks about his or her problems with an auditor while
holding cans connected to a "Hubbard Electrometer," which mea-
sures an individual's skin responses. 112 Scientologists claim that a
person can cure emotional and spiritual problems through audit-
ing. Former members claimed that Scientology leaders promised
them certain benefits, such as increased IQs, better career opportu-
nities, and improved eyesight, that never materialized."' 3 Suits by
ex-Scientologists, alleging breach of contract and fraud, have been
brought for damages in the millions of dollars.1 4
Contractual arguments are strengthened by tax decisions that
define tax-deductible contributions as payments made "for de-
tached and disinterested motives.11 5 The IRS has denied tax de-
ductions in cases of religious contributions that are made not as
"voluntary transfers without consideration, but ... with the ex-
pectation of receiving a commensurate benefit in return." 16 Con-
tributions made to religious that promise specific benefits thus are
treated as a commercial transaction and not as a gift under the tax
code. 1
Scientology, Inc., No. 41074 (Mass. Super. Ct. Suffolk County filed Apr. 2, 1980). These cases
are discussed in Heins, supra note 21, at 156 n.11.
112. A Hubbard Electrometer is really a skin galvanometer that an individual operates by
holding two cans while being monitored by an auditor. If the Hubbard Electrometer shows a
stable reading, the individual is considered successful in overcoming a particular problem.
For a description of Scientology and its methods, see Heins, supra note 21, at 156-57.
Another organization, the Church of the New Civilization, uses the same or similar meth-
ods. See Religious Technology Center v. Wallersheim, 796 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 1336 (1987) (rejecting the Church of Scientology's trade secrets argument
to enjoin the Church of the New Civilization from using allegedly stolen Scientology
materials).
113. Id.
114. In Van Schaick, a plaintiff unsuccessfully sought $200 million in damages as well as
attachment of church real estate and receivership over church assets. Heins, supra note 21,
at 156-57. For a discussion of this case, see infra note 200.
115. See, e.g., Graham v. Commissioner, 822 F.2d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 1987).
116. Graham v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 575, 581 (1984), aff'd, 822 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1987).
117. Graham, 822 F.2d at 849.
If a transaction is structured in the form of a quid pro quo, where it is under-
stood that the taxpayer's money will not pass to the charitable organization
unless the taxpayer receives a specific benefit in return, and where the tax-
payer cannot receive the benefit unless he pays the required price, then the
transaction does not qualify for [tax deduction].
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The Scientology cases, however, are of only limited use to pri-
vate citizens who have been defrauded by religious television solici-
tations. These past suits alleged specific promises made in at-
tracting new members and involved direct, long-term relationships.
The contractual arguments in these cases were based on clear ver-
bal and written promises made by the church in return for contri-
butions and participation in auditing sessions." 8 Conversely, citi-
zens deceived by televangelists have made gifts to their churches
without any consideration in return. Often, little is said about spe-
cific programs, and many times contributions are solicited to sup-
port the ministry in general. Although some contractual questions
are raised by these solicitations, reliance on contractual theories
for recovery is highly problematic. 19 Similarly, without proof of
emotional distress or direct personal injury from a fraudulent solic-
itation, tort remedies are largely useless. 2 ° The only private ac-
tions brought against churches for fraudulent solicitation involve
very special solicitation schemes. In suits against the Church of
Hakeem, for example, citizens sued for the money they "invested"
in the pyramid scheme. 2' They were able to allege contractual vio-
lations and civil fraud because they were individually promised
four-fold returns on their money.
Id.
118. See id. at 847.
119. An interesting contractual issue is raised by World Vision's Child Care Partnership
Program. See supra note 56. World Vision accepts monthly contributions for specific chil-
dren. There are indications, however, that contributions actually go into a large central fund
and that a number of patrons receive pictures of the same child. Johnston & Leonard, supra
note 3, at 3, col. 1. World Vision and similar organizations could be viewed as agents in such
programs, bearing contractual and quasi-contractual responsibilities. Similar questions are
raised by relief drives such as Feed The Children, in which the Larry Jones Evangelistic
Association solicited funds by stressing that "$15 will feed a family for one month and...
$50 will buy 10 blankets." Sontag, supra note 25, at 52, col. 2. The organization reportedly
never fully explained the nature of its mission nor the fact that only 35% of the funds went
to "child care." Id.
120. The most likely defendants in religious tort cases are faith healers who encourage the
suspension of medical or psychological treatment. For example, after one service by faith
healer Peter Popoff, investigators reportedly found "life-sustaining drugs discarded in trash
cans.., including insulin tablets, nitroglycerin and digitalis." Dart, supra note 23. Popoff
denies that he advocates total suspension of medical treatment. Id. See also Woodward,
supra note 46, at 51, col.3 (Jimmy Swaggart considers psychological counseling "to be of the
Devil").
121. United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1981).
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Nevertheless, the primary reason for the dearth of citizen suits is
an absence of private litigation incentives. Most state remedies
simply lack the potential damages that can sustain private citizens
through a drawn-out litigation battle. For example, church mem-
bers probably do have standing when alleging a church leader's
breach of fiduciary duties.'22 Yet the benefits of such a suit would
accrue to the organization as a whole and not directly to the indi-
vidual plaintiffs. 123  Accordingly, church members must sue
televangelists for recovery of church funds spent for personal pur-
poses under a derivative suit theory.'24 Any incentive in doing so,
however, would be purely spiritual and would offer little tangible
support or reward for the difficult discovery, trial, and appellate
process.
B. Governmental Enforcement
Federal and state officials have been more successful than pri-
vate individuals in combating religious fraud, albeit on a limited
basis. The Federal Communications Commission and the Internal
Revenue Service are the primary government agencies involved in
regulating religious racketeers. Both of these agencies control the
lifeblood of television ministries-broadcasting rights and tax ex-
emption-and in a few instances have successfully prosecuted
fraudulent religious organizations.
1. The Federal Communications Commission: "Plugged into
Heaven"
Religious organizations use the television airwaves in two ways.
First, the larger religious organizations broadcast weekly or daily
religious or relief programming. 2 " Some of these televangelists ac-
tually operate their own television networks. 26 Second, some
televangelists share network time for shorter religious program-
122. Church of Hakeem v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. App. 3d 384, 168 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1980).
See also Comment, supra note 21, at 1211.
123. Comment, supra note 21, at 1211.
124. Id.
125. For a good discussion of the number and variety of current religious programming
and commercials, see W. FORE, TELEVISION AND RELIGION (1987).
126. Paul Crouch, Jerry Falwell, and Pat Robertson all operate their own networks. See
supra notes 37, 38, 43.
[Vol. 29:441
RELIGIOUS RACKETEERS
ming and solicitation appeals. Relief organizations also buy com-
mercial time on cable networks for their solicitation messages.
To some degree, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) controls both religious television programming and commer-
cial advertising. Although the FCC leaves the regulation of com-
mercial advertising largely to the Federal Trade Commission and
the discretion of the stations themselves,127 occasionally it has
taken an interest in religious television programming and ministry
solicitations. Thus far, the FCC has held hearings in a few cases of
alleged religious fraud, usually involving fraudulent general solici-
tation. The most noteworthy case involved televangelist W. Eugene
Scott, whose nonprofit church corporation, Faith Center, operated
its own television station.128 Scott was renowned among televange-
lists for his aggressive donation solicitations, sometimes shaming
noncontributors.129 After a five-year battle, the FCC revoked Faith
Center's license after hearing allegations of Scott's improper use of
church funds. 30 Interestingly, however, the FCC's action denying
the station its operating license was based not on the alleged
fraudulent activities, which were never proven, but on Scott's re-
fusal to cooperate with federal investigators.'
The Scott affair illustrates the limited deterrent value of FCC
action against televangelists. After losing the license for his own
station, Scott simply bought time on other religious stations and
continued his programming. 3 2 Another practical limitation became
evident in the 1982 FCC action against Jim Bakker. In that inves-
tigation, the FCC heard testimony of "serious misconduct, includ-
ing substantial and material questions of fraudulent use of the air-
waves, breach of fiduciary duty false testimony and corrupt
influence of witnesses."'1 3 Before the FCC could act, however, Bak-
127. Finding a case involving FTC action against a religious advertiser is difficult. The
political and legal problems involved in analogizing a religious enterprise to a commercial
product may explain the FTC's apparent reluctance to pursue religious fraud.
128. Johnston & Leonard, supra note 3, at 3, col. 1. Scott's Glendale, California, ministry
operated Channel 30 before the FCC revoked the station's license to broadcast in 1978.
129. Id.
130. Scott v. Younger, 739 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1984).
131. Johnston & Leonard, supra note 3, at 3, col. 1.
132. Id.
133. Holsendolph, F.C.C. Decision in Preacher's Inquiry Stirs Debate, N.Y. Times, Dec.
12, 1982, at 29, col. 1.
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ker circumvented a proposed FCC sanction by transferring the tel-
evision station to a religious foundation which in turn agreed to
pay $1.4 million of Bakker's debts.1 14 Bakker operates another tele-
vision station in Fort Mill, South Carolina.3 5
FCC action against televangelists remains a rarity. The FCC is
hampered by its own administrative limitations. An FCC decision
not to renew a license spawns years of costly litigation and investi-
gation. For example, the FCC spent five years investigating and
holding hearings on the Scott affair, and ultimately none of the
charges of fraud were substantiated. 13 6 The nonrenewal of Scott's
license on the grounds of failure to supply documents and records
was a dubious victory. The FCC's infrequent action against
televangelists and the remote possibility of actual penalties seri-
ously undermine the usefulness of FCC sanctions in combating re-
ligious racketeers.
2. The Internal Revenue Service: Rendering unto Caesar
The most successful governmental sanctions for religious fraud
have come from enforcement of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC).
Since early in the country's history, religious organizations have
been accorded tax-exempt status by state and local govern-
ments. 37 In addition to the general community support for ad-
vancing religious beliefs, the basis for this tradition is largely the
belief that taxing churches would raise serious constitutional
problems with both the free exercise and establishment clauses of
the Constitution. 8"
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) can bring any of a number
of possible sanctions against religious racketeers. First, it can
charge church leaders with tax fraud for failure to report misap-
134. Brown, TV License Decision Sparks Angry Dissent at FCC, Wash. Post, Dec. 11,
1982, at A7, col. 1. Bakker sold the Canton, Ohio, station to anticommunist crusader Billy
James Hargis. Ostling, supra note 25, at 69. After allowing Bakker to sell the station, the
FCC voted to "forward relevant information to the Justice Department about [the] nonpub-
lic inquiry into whether PTL ... its principals or affiliates were involved in 'fraud by wire,
radio or television.'" Holsendolph, supra note 133, at 29, col. 1.
135. Ostling, supra, note 6, at 60.
136. Johnston & Leonard, supra note 3, at 3, col. 1. See supra text accompanying notes
118-21.
137. Rakay & Sugarman, supra note 9, at 865 n.11, 875-76.
138. Id. at 879.
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propriated funds. Second, it can sue church leaders for unpaid
taxes on unreported income. Third, it can retroactively or prospec-
tively revoke a church's tax-exempt status. Unlike the FCC, the
IRS has instituted a fair number of these suits and has seriously
hampered numerous fraudulent religious enterprises."3 9 Using the
charge of tax fraud to prosecute otherwise-protected criminals is
nothing new, however. Mobsters such as Al Capone went to jail for
the first time after the IRS proved that they had failed to report
ill-gotten gains. The most famous religious leader to be prosecuted
for tax fraud is probably the Reverend Sun Myung Moon, leader of
the three-million-member Unification Church.14 ° In 1982, the IRS
successfully showed that Moon had conspired to avoid taxes on
$162,000 in personal income and sentenced him to prison. 4'
The IRS also has charged a number of "mail order ministries"
with tax evasion. Mail order ministries are churches established by
ministers who are accredited for a small fee by a central accredita-
tion church. The IRS has revealed how these "ministers" avoid
taxes by obtaining mail order accreditation. New ministers often
take a vow of poverty and give all their earthly possessions to their
church. The church then pays all their expenses, tax free. 42 In one
case, Charles Kageler, an airline pilot, was sentenced to four years
in prison and fined $5000 for his mail order ministry in which he
claimed his home as a parsonage and his private plane as a church
vehicle. 43 Analogies may be drawn between the tax evasion found
139. See, e.g., United States v. Heinemann, 801 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107
S. Ct. 1308 (1987); Pollard v. Commissioner, 786 F.2d 1063 (11th Cir. 1986); Incorporated
Trustees of the Gospel Workers Soc'y v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 374 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 672
F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 944 (1982); Christian Echoes Nat'l Minis-
try, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973);
Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 412 F.2d 1197 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 1009 (1970); see also supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
140. United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 971
(1984). See Lubasch, Rev. Moon Is Convicted of Income Tax Fraud, N.Y. Times, May 19,
1982, at 1, col. 3.
141. Lubasch, supra note 140, at 1, col. 3.
142. See Note, Mail Order Ministries, The Religious Purpose Exemption, and The Con-
stitution, 33 TAX LAW. 959 (1980); Crewdson, I.R.S. is Challenging Mail-Order Pastors,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1981, at A14, col. 1.
143. Comment, supra note 21, at 1213 n.38. These mail order ministries sometimes spring
up to replace ministries that have been stripped of tax exemption by the IRS. In United
States v. DubS, 820 F.2d 886 (7th Cir. 1987), Reverend DubS took a "vow of poverty" with
the Life Science Church, which made him a tax-exempt minister for $500. Id. at 888 (the
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in the Kageler case and the actions of televangelists who live in
large estates at church expense. The IRS has treated mail order
churches differently from other religious cases, however, and it has
never brought a tax evasion charge against a major televangelist or
large religious group.'
Another sanction used by the IRS is the revocation of a church's
tax-exempt status. Revocation can be the death knell for a reli-
gious organization, particularly a television ministry with high op-
erating costs. The IRS has used this sanction against churches in a
variety of cases. The IRS found one church to be primarily a polit-
ical rather than a religious organization.'" Another church was
found to be primarily a business rather than a religious enter-
prise.146 On a larger scale, the IRS has also revoked the tax exemp-
tion of churches such as the Founding Church of Scientology for
using church funds for the personal enrichment of church
leaders. 147
Tax-exempt status is a near-essential prerequisite for most tele-
vision ministries, which require this exemption to offset high pro-
church tossed in an ordination for Dub 's wife for only $100 more). The court remarked that
the "type of 'poverty' Dub6 achieved by signing the 'vow of poverty' is likely to cause won-
derment among certain recognized religious orders." Id. After the Life Science Church came
under attack, Dub6 received credentials from two additional ministries, ultimately ending
up as an apostle, a bishop, and a convicted tax evader. Id. at 887-89.
144. Although the IRS has never revoked the tax-exempt status of a large, main-line reli-
gious organization, it has denied tax exemptions to individual members of such organiza-
tions. E.g., Schuster v. Commissioner, 800 F.2d 672 (7th Cir. 1986) (privately employed
Catholic nun subject to vow of poverty could not claim tax exemption for salary as health
professional); Fogarty v. United States, 780 F.2d 1005 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (Catholic priest em-
ployed as college professor not entitled to claim tax exemption for salary even though all
checks turned over to religious order pursuant to vow of poverty).
145. Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972),
cert denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973). Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code defines a
tax-exempt organization as one "which does not participate in, or intervene in (including
the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of any candi-
date for public office." I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982). Interestingly, this restriction has also been
used against the Roman Catholic Church by pro-choice groups, which argue that the
Church's anti-abortion campaign should deprive it of tax-exempt status. See, e.g., Abortion
Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Baker (In re U.S. Catholic Conference), 824 F.2d 156 (2d Cir.
1987).
146. Incorporated Trustees of the Gospel Worker Soc'y v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 374
(D.D.C.), aff'd, 672 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 944 (1982).
147. Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 412 F.2d 1197 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1009 (1970).
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duction costs. Jerry Falwell, for example, had to lay off 225 em-
ployees and temporarily cancel his programming because of higher
expenses caused by a delay in getting tax exemption for his Lib-
erty University in Lynchburg, Virginia. 48 One televangelist is cur-
rently facing the possible revocation of his organization's exemp-
tion. After it became known that Jim Bakker and his wife Tammy
drew $1.3 million in salary over a three-year period, the IRS began
an investigation of his entire PTL enterprise. 49 Recently, the IRS
publicly acknowledged that it was considering a retroactive revoca-
tion of PTL's tax-exemption for a five-year period as a penalty.150
The IRS allows employees of charitable tax-exempt organizations
to receive only reasonable salaries, and thus excessive salaries like
those of the Bakkers and their aides might be grounds for a tempo-
rary punitive revocation of the organization's tax exemption.' 5'
However, this line of argument for the IRS is fraught with subjec-
tive judgment regarding what constitutes a reasonable salary. 52
The IRS has also faced stiff public opposition to its occasional
suits against religious organizations. The most severe public back-
lash came after the IRS revoked the tax-exempt status of Bob
Jones University on public policy grounds because the school pro-
hibited interracial dating.5 3 Recently, religious groups objected to
new IRS rules requiring some religious organizations to reveal
148. Ostling, supra note 6, at 67. Probably the strangest case of a revocation of tax ex-
emption is Zion Coptic Church, Inc. v. United States, 79-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9325 (S.D.
Fla. 1979), in which the IRS forced a church group to pay more than $2 million in taxes for
failing to report income earned from 33 tons of marijuana purchased by the church. Id.
149. Ostling, supra note 6, at 67. See also Ostling, supra note 62, at 52 ("the IRS believed
the [PTL] organization did not operate exclusively for tax-exempt purposes and that part of
its income personally benefited the Bakkers and others").
150. Nightline, supra note 11, at 2. Emboldened by the PTL scandal, the IRS announced
that it is conducting 25 audits of televangelist organizations. Merida, TV Preachers Vow to
Police Selves, Dallas Morning News, Oct. 7, 1987, at 3A, col. 3. Nevertheless, IRS Commis-
sioner Lawrence Gibbs insists that the IRS can do little because of congressional and judi-
cial restraints. Id. See Ostling, supra note 25, at 64.
151. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982).
152. Given the size of the PTL empire, a salary the size of Bakker's is not clearly beyond
the scope of reasonableness. Likewise, what constitutes reasonable fringe benefits raises dif-
ficult constitutional questions, particularly with large religious sects that actively lavish gifts
on their leaders. See, e.g., Bhagwon Shree Rajneesh: Worldly Guru in the Western Wild,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 14, 1985, at 15.
153. Woodward, supra note 10, at 78. Bob Jones University, located in Greenville, South
Carolina, is a fundamentalist school committed to a strict interpretation of the Bible.
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more of their financial records before receiving tax-exempt sta-
tus.15 4 With an estimated 340,000 churches not filing annual re-
ports, the IRS insists that there is little it can do to combat reli-
gious fraud.155
3. Political and Practical Problems of Governmental Deter-
rence
The problem with governmental suits against fraudulent reli-
gious organizations is evident in past FCC and IRS prosecutions.
The FCC rarely has taken an aggressive stand against fraudulent
programming, and when it has, the results have been disap-
pointing. Even when the FCC revokes a televangelist's license, reli-
gious leaders can still purchase time on other religious television
networks. The IRS has had more success than the FCC in prose-
cuting religious organizations, but its efforts have been directed
largely against fringe religions such as the Church of Hakeem. For
the IRS to redirect its efforts from mail order churches to a church
the size of PTL (with 13.5 million viewers daily) will be difficult.
The pending investigation of PTL will show how successful or dar-
ing the IRS can be in prosecuting televangelists. Nevertheless, the
infrequency of prosecution and the even more infrequent imposi-
tions of penalties make the IRS more of an annoyance than a
deterrent.
Federal and state governments have used legal tactics other than
licensing and tax hearings in combating religious fraud. In Califor-
nia, the Attorney General's office moved against Herbert Arm-
strong's Worldwide Church of God under its authority over all
charitable trusts, alleging that Armstrong was selling enormous
amounts of church property at a loss in order to put church assets
in a form that could be more easily appropriated by the individual
defendants.1 56 Although this particular case was later dropped af-
ter public outcry, the charitable trust approach may be a legiti-
154. The National Conference of Churches strongly opposes any additional mandatory
reporting rule. Id. Wilfred Caron, general counsel for the United States Catholic Confer-
ence, likens the IRS regulations to "slaying the whole herd to get at one supposedly sick
calf." Id. at 79.
155. Klott, supra note 85, at 9, col. 4 (statement of Lawrence B. Gibbs, Internal Revenue
Commissioner).
156. Comment, supra note 21, at 1208-09.
[Vol. 29:441
RELIGIOUS RACKETEERS
mate avenue for governmental intervention. Under this approach,
a state could ask for the imposition of receiverships, injunctions,
and other remedies used in trust actions "based on the state's obli-
gation to protect the public interest in situations where there is no
individual capable of asserting the interest.' 157 Nevertheless, this
analogy to trusts is subject to a great deal of question and proba-
bly would not be a sufficient rationale in most jurisdictions.'58
State and federal governments have also instituted civil and
criminal fraud actions against religious organizations. The federal
government brought a fraud charge against a religious organization
as early as 1917. In that case, New v. United States,'59 the govern-
ment charged Reverend New with religious chicanery, alleging that
the religious leader
had no supernatural power or authority of any kind or charac-
ter, but was an imposter, an heretic, a seeker of vainglory, a
covetor of his neighbor's goods and his neighbor's wife, and was
also a habitual indulger in each and every of the sins and prac-
tices he pretended to condemn.160
A more recent example of a governmental fraud action against a
church is United States v. Rasheed.161 The federal government
charged Reverend Rasheed with six counts of mail fraud, in addi-
tion to other charges, for his "Dare to be Rich" program. The trial
court concluded that Rasheed knowingly misrepresented his pyra-
mid or "ponzi" scheme and convicted him on all six counts of mall
fraud.16 2
Governmental prosecutions for fraud, however, remain a rar-
ity.'6 3 Both state and federal agencies are noticeably reluctant to
157. Id. at 1209.
158. Id. at 1210.
159. 245 F. 710 (9th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 246 U.S. 665 (1918).
160. Id. at 713.
161. 663 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1981). See supra text accompanying notes 70-75.
162. Rasheed, 663 F.2d at 845.
163. The government occasionally has prosecuted religious organizations under the fraud
statutes. In United States v. Gering, 716 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1983), the government success-
fully convicted Reverend Howard Gering, the Pentecostal leader of the Evangelical Scrip-
ture Mission, of 24 counts of mail fraud. Gering had solicited contributions for the publica-
tion and distribution of Christian books in Indonesia. One $300,000 contributor, however,
went to Indonesia and failed to find evidence of Gering's good works. Id. at 620. Gering
unsuccessfully argued that he had never transferred money directly to Indonesia because he
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allege fraud by religious organizations, particularly established
ones. Most state prosecutors choose not to violate the strong com-
munity taboo against governmental meddling in religious affairs.
Prosecutors prefer not to act without a strong mandate from the
state legislature. Although they have considerable experience with
RICO prosecutions, federal prosecutors manifest a similar
reluctance. 164
Governmental prosecution of religious groups will always be dif-
ficult practically and politically. Federal and state prosecution can-
not be assured at the levels necessary for effective deterrence. For
this reason, private action may prove the most efficient and relia-
ble answer to religious fraud. Private attorneys general have
proven highly successful in the environmental and antitrust ar-
eas. 165 Private enforcement may be even more vital in the area of
religious fraud because the alternative-governmental enforce-
ment-carries with it a plethora of constitutional complications.
Also, religious fraud might be best detected and proven by individ-
uals involved with a particular ministry. Given the right incentives,
private suits could be brought in numbers that might deter fraudu-
lent religious solicitation. As the next section will show, those in-
centives can be found in the civil RICO provisions
IV. FRAUD AND THE FAITHFUL: SUING RELIGIOUS RACKETEERS
UNDER CivIL RICO AND THE GAINS MULTIPLICATION APPROACH
Fraud cases against religious leaders and organizations generally
have alleged various counts of mall or wire fraud."" These charges
preferred to call a Mr. Simatupong (who was never located) in Indonesia and have him
remove an equivalent amount of funds from a reserve fund kept buried in strongboxes (also
never located). Id.
164. Criminal RICO charges, contrary to simple fraud charges, have never been brought
against a religious leader. Lauter, supra note 70, at 17 (noting that prosecutors as well as
private plaintiffs "hesitate to bring cases against churches, sometimes not pursuing cases
that might otherwise be prosecuted"). The specter of state entanglement is most formidable
in criminal RICO cases, in which prosecutors have actually taken control of a union away
from its mob-connected leaders. See Galen, Union Suits, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 31, 1987, at 1, col.
1 (union control transferred to trustee under RICO provisions regarding syndicate-con-
trolled organizations).
165. See Turley, supra note 17.
166. See, e.g., United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1981); New v. United
States, 245 F. 710 (9th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 246 U.S. 665 (1918).
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are often brought as part of a multicount prosecution and carry
maximum penalties of five years in prison and $1000 fine per
count. 167 Mail or wire fraud, however, can also serve as a predicate
offense under RICO. In comparison, a RICO charge based on two
mail or wire fraud counts can lead to a 20-year sentence, a $25,000
fine, and the possible forfeiture of the defendant's entire
business. 68
The RICO statutes are the product of a massive legislative cam-
paign "seek[ing] the eradication of organized crime in the United
States."'6 9 During the 1950s, a widespread public outcry followed
reports of expanding underworld presence in legitimate busi-
nesses.17 0 A bipartisan effort, RICO was intended to root out the
influence of organized crime by imposing both criminal and civil
penalties.' In designing RICO, Congress was cognizant of the fact
167. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
168. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(1), 1961-(4) 1961(5), 1962(c) 1962(d), 1963(a). Recently, courts
hearing RICO claims have refused to apply the general rule in fraud cases that a single
fraudulent letter sent to two people constitutes two offenses. As a result, in civil RICO cases
when mail fraud is used as predicate offense, a court will not find a pattern of racketeering
if several related acts of mail fraud were part of a single scheme. See, e.g., Holmberg v.
Morrisette, 800 F.2d 205, 209-10 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1953 (1987).
169. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 923 (1970).
170. Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237 (1982). See 1 ABA SECTION OF CORPORATION, BANKING AND BUSI-
NESS, REPORT OF THE AD Hoc Civm RICO TASK FORCE 75 (Mar. 28, 1985) [hereinafter ABA
REPORT]. One committee noted in its reports to the United States Senate that "[o]ne of the
most perplexing problems in the field of organized crime is presented by the fact that
criminals and racketeers are using the profits of organized crime to buy up and operate
legitimate business enterprises." S. REP. No. 141, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1951). The com-
mittee listed many categories of American businesses that were being infiltrated by organ-
ized crime. S. REP. No. 307, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 170-81 (1951). The committee pointed out:
"In most cases, these are enterprises in which gangster methods have been used to obtain
monopolies so that their vicious practices taint otherwise legitimate businesses .... They
are able to compete unfairly with legitimate businessmen because of their accumulations of
cash and their vicious methods." S. REP. No. 2370, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1950).
171. ABA REPORT, supra note 170, at 86. Senator Hruska pointed out that S. 1623 at-
tacked the "economic power of organized crime ... on two fronts-criminal and civil." 115
CONG. REc. 6993 (1969). He considered the civil aspect of the bill the most important
[T]he criminal provisions are intended primarily as an adjunct to the civil pro-
visions which I consider as the more important feature of the bill....
The bill is innovative in the sense that it vitalizes procedures which have been
tried and proven in the antitrust field and applies them into the organized
crime field where they have been seldom used before. Hopefully, experts on
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that it was "entering a new domain of federal involvement ...
[and] that existing law, state and federal, was not adequate to ad-
dress the problem .... ,1171 RICO's sponsors committed themselves
to developing new, more potent weapons to carry out its intent.
The Act contained unparalleled legal resources for both prosecu-
tors and plaintiffs, which soon found applications far beyond the
realm of organized crime. RICO's provisions ultimately proved so
generous that one Supreme Court Justice labeled the Court's inter-
pretation of the Act "the federalization of broad areas of state
common law of frauds. '1 73
RICO's uncanny adaptability to any fraud-related area is largely
due to the Act's definition of "racketeering." Traditionally viewed
as one engaged in severe wrongdoing, under RICO a racketeer be-
came any person who could be shown to have committed two pred-
icate acts-which would constitute a "pattern of racketeer-
ing"-within a ten-year period and who could be linked to an
"enterprise"; that is, any ongoing or continuing unit of persons
manifesting a common financial purpose.1 74 Congress intended this
broad definition to facilitate prosecution of crimes in which actual
evidence of the crime is normally concealed or disguised by the
actors. 175 Congress thus sought to pierce the mask of legitimacy
used by mob-infiltrated businesses. Consequently, the absence of a
organized crime will be able to conceive of additional applications of the law.
The potential is great.
Id. at 6993-94.
172. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586 (1981).
173. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 501 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"The Court's interpretation of [the scope] of the civil RICO statute quite simply revolution-
izes private litigation; it validates the federalization of broad areas of state common law of
frauds .. " Id. See also Fleet Management Sys. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 627 F.
Supp. 550, 555 (C.D. IMI. 1986). "One result [of civil RICO] has been that litigators, lured by
the prospect of treble damages, are now turning to federal court in garden-variety fraud
claims that would in the past have proceeded in state court." Id.
174. United States v. Dickens, 695 F.2d 765 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1092
(1983).
175. In support of RICO's passage on the floor of the House of Representatives, Congress-
man Rodino emphasized that "[dirastic methods . . . are essential, and we must develop
law enforcement measures at least as efficient as those of organized crime." 116 CONG. REc.
35-199 (1970). See also id. at 18,940 (remarks of Sen. McClellan). "It is impossible to draw
an effective statute which reaches most of the commercial activities of organized crimes, yet
does not include offenses commonly committed by persons outside organized crime as well."
Id.
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mob connection or the existence of an established business name
became wholly irrelevant as the focus of investigations shifted
from complex conspiracy linkages to proving the existence of two
predicate acts and a racketeering enterprise.
In addition to defining the racketeering offense broadly to facili-
tate prosecutions, Congress supplied potential government and pri-
vate litigants with an impressive array of legal tools to insure suc-
cess. On the criminal side, Congress authorized severe fines and
sentences for anyone convicted under the Act. Federal prosecutors
may ask for as much as $25,000 for each proven offense in addition
to a potential twenty-year sentence.17 6 Moreover, the Act autho-
rizes prosecutors to seize and sell property belonging to convicted
racketeers. 17 7
On the civil side, penalties are equally severe. Borrowing freely
from the antitrust area, Congress authorized civil suits under the
Act to create a secondary deterrent force of private attorneys gen-
eral. 7 8 Congress fueled this private enforcement mechanism with a
number of procedural and financial incentives. The Act authorizes
treble damages as well as attorney's fees and costs for successful
plaintiffs. 17 9 Congress also relaxed the standing requirements for
RICO plaintiffs, requiring only that a party allege a "business or
176. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a).
177. Id. Section 1963(a) permits the government to seize
(1) any interest [a racketeer] has acquired or maintained in violation [of the
Act], and (2) any interest, in security of, claim against, or property or contrac-
tual right of any kind affording a source of influence over, any enterprise which
he has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the con-
duct of, in violation of [the Act].
For a brief discussion of the forfeiture provisions of RICO, see generally Russello v. United
States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983).
178. Congress borrowed the civil RICO private enforcement mechanism, 18 U.S.C. §
1964(c), directly from § 4 of the Clayton Act. Representative Poff described this RICO pro-
vision as "another example of the antitrust remedy being adapted for use against organized
criminality." 116 CONG. REc. 35,295 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Poff).
179. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) provides: "Any person injured in his business or property by
reason of a violation of [the Act] may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district
court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including
a reasonable attorney's fee." Prosecutors may use this same standard of proof in actions
brought under civil rather than criminal RICO. United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351,
1357 (7th Cir. 1974); Comment, RICO and Equitable Remedies Not Available for Private
Litigants, 21 CAL. W.L. REv. 385, 388 n.23 (1985).
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property" injury "by reason of a [RICO] violation. ' 180 Moreover,
the Act gives courts the authority to serve and join parties residing
outside their districts"' and contains an exceptionally broad venue
provision, permitting suits in any "district in which [the defend-
ant] resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs."'81 2 Fi-
nally, once in court, plaintiffs are required to prove their case by
simply a preponderance of the evidence-in other words, they
must show only that the occurrence of the racketeering offense is
more probable than not.'
A. Civil RICO: Penalty Maximization and the Economics of
Racketeering
The procedural and damages provisions of civil RICO demon-
strate certain critical, though often unstated, policy assumptions
by Congress that sharply distinguish the Act from antitrust
schemes. In civil RICO, Congress sought to create a sanction, not a
price, for the crime of racketeering. 84 This distinction can be best
understood with reference to the antitrust provisions that served
as the statutory template foi civil RICO's damages provisions.8 5 In
the antitrust area, damages can be viewed as the "price" for a vio-
180. Id.
181. 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a)-(d).
182. 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a).
183. Farmers Bank of Del. v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278, 1280 (D. Del. 1978).
Some critics of civil RICO have suggested that the standard of proof be raised to account for
the high stigma attached to a "racketeering" conviction. See, e.g., Note, Enforcing Criminal
Laws Through Civil Proceedings: Section 1964 of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,
53 TFx. L. REv. 1055, 1064 (1975).
184. Turley, supra note 17.
185. Congress incorporated antitrust remedies into RICO at the suggestion of the ABA's
Antitrust Section, which confirmed that racketeering had severe anticompetitive effects as
well as other social costs. The substance of the Antitrust Section's report and its subsequent
history are set out extensively in ABA REPORT, supra note 159.
The Section agreed "that organized crime must be stopped," and further
agreed that "the time tested machinery of the antitrust laws contains several
useful and workable features which are appropriate for use against organized
crime," including, in addition to criminal penalties, civil enforcement by pri-
vate party treble damage actions. The ABA Section stressed ... that "it pre-
fers the approach of S. 2049. By placing the antitrust-type enforcement and
discovery procedures in a separate statute, a commingling of criminal enforce-
ment goals with the goals of regulating competition is avoided."
Id. at 81.
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lation. The price reflects the external costs of the violation to soci-
ety.8" By setting the price of the violation, society in essence de-
termines the point beyond which a violation will produce more
than its cost to society. Like the renowned "efficient breach," anti-
trust violations are encouraged when the violations will serve the
parties while internalizing their own costs.
A sanction as used in civil RICO performs an entirely different
function. Unlike a price, a sanction is meant to deter any occur-
rence of an activity.8 7 A society establishes a sanction when it con-
siders a violation so costly, financially or morally, that a price is
impossible to gauge. In establishing certain penalties for racketeer-
ing, Congress began from the premise that racketeering was malum
in se. 188 Although Congress incorporated the antitrust multiplier,
treble damages, into civil RICO, the purpose of using a multiplier
was entirely different from the antitrust model. Civil RICO's treble
damages were meant not to reform or regulate racketeers but to
ruin them.189 The notion of an "efficient racketeering offense" had
no place in Congress's goal of delivering "a mortal blow against the
property interests of organized crime."190
186. Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1523, 1524 (1984).
187. Id. at 1537. See Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 608, 712-13 (1987) (civil RICO
designed to deter all racketeering).
188. Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1358 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983).
[T]o the extent that antitrust law and policy are increasingly concerned pri-
marily with market efficiency rather than the deleterious effects of concen-
trated market power itself, analogies to that body of law become increasing
irrelevant, since the exercise of social power by organized crime is thought to
be malum in se."
Id. (emphasis in original).
189. Ralston v. Capper, 569 F. Supp. 1575, 1580 (E.D. Mich. 1983) ("[RICO] is precisely
designed to ruin those individuals and enterprises it is aimed at") (emphasis in original).
See also 116 CONG. REc. 819 (1970) (Remarks of Sen. Scott) (civil RICO's "purpose is to
eradicate organized crime in the United States"); id. at 35,199 (remarks of Rep. Rodino)
(civil RICO makes "a truly full-scale commitment to destroy the insidious power of organ-
ized crime groups"); id. at 35,300 (remarks of Rep. Mayne) (civil RICO stands for the pro-
position that organized crime "must be sternly and irrevocably eradicated"), cited in United
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 589 n.11 (1981).
190. 116 CONG. REc. 602 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Hruska). See also Electronic Relays (In-
dia) Pvt. Ltd. v. Pascente, 610 F. Supp. 648, 651 (N.D. Ill 1985) ("treble damages ... pro-
vide the incentive . . . to cause.., private citizens to assist the government in eradicating
organized crime").
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Considered from the standpoint of a sanction, civil RICO's dam-
age provision takes on added economic meaning. In developing a
sanction rather than a price for racketeering offenses, Congress
created a structure to force racketeers into insolvency through pro-
hibitive sanctions.191 The antitrust pricing system, conversely,
seeks to "cost minimize" or set the price for a violation as close as
possible to the violation's actual external costs, so as not to deter
"efficient violations."'91 2 In civil RICO, Congress sought to "penalty
maximize," or drive up costs and penalties for racketeers, to elimi-
nate any possibility that an "efficient violation" could occur. Under
civil RICO, therefore, a plaintiff can receive a treble award for any
damages sustained through the racketeering offense, not just for
competitive injuries."19 Moreover, civil RICO's combination of at-
torney's fees and a minimal standard of proof creates a variation of
what economists refer to as a "rent-seeking" phenomenon.' That
191. Turley, supra note 17. The author refers to this structure as penalty maximization, a
useful term to parallel cost minimization and highlight the different purposes of prices and
sanctions in a legal scheme. Pricing violations are essential in areas such as antitrust, in
which the focus is on market efficiency. Cost minimization can be viewed as that process by
which the actual costs of a violation are isolated to better determine the price of the viola-
tion. Conversely, a sanctioning system is geared toward driving up costs to prevent any oc-
currence of the offense. In civil RICO, this sanctioning process is even more accentuated
because of the Act's policy of ruining racketeers.
192. The concept of cost minimization was developed by Gary Becker. Becker, Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). This concern for market
efficiency and pricing violations in terms of their external costs is widely accepted in the
antitrust area. See generally Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524, 532 (2d Cir. 1984); Turley,
supra note 17.
193. The Supreme Court put to rest the requirement that plaintiffs show a "competitive"
or "commercial" injury in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985). The Court
defined an injury as a harm caused by the predicate acts. Id. at 495, 497. See Comment,
Civil RICO: The Resolution of the Racketeering Enterprise Injury Requirement, 21 CAL.
W.L. REV. 364, 367-68 n.24 (1985).
194. See Turley, supra note 17. Rent-seeking is a natural occurrence in any competitive
economic system, although excessive rent-seeking can produce prohibitive welfare costs for
society. A "rent" is often defined cryptically as a "payment to a resource owner over and
above the amount his resources could command in their next-best alternative use." R.
EKELuND & R. ToLLIsON, MERCANTILISM AS A RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 18 (1981). Gordon Tul-
lock discusses rent-seeking more concretely. Tullock, Efficient Rent Seeking, in READINGS IN
THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 56 (V. Goldberg ed. 1985) (unpublished manuscript). Tul-
lock explains the rent-seeking phenomenon through a simple lottery analogy in which two
players pursue a $100 prize. In pursuing the prize, each player invests according to what he
believes the other party will invest. Excessive rent-seeking occurs when both parties invest
more than $100 in pursuing the prize, thereby producing waste.
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is, by creating the high prize of treble damages and providing an
easy means of seeking this prize, Congress may have created an
environment in which litigants on both sides will spend excessively
to pursue or avoid RICO convictions. The negative aspect of rent-
seeking thus has become part of RICO's overall penalty-maximiz-
ing scheme.
Civil RICO's damages structure reveals a philosophy often at
odds with suggested modifications of the Act, particularly those
advocating a closer adherence to the antitrust approach.195 These
fundamental elements of the Act, however, are also useful in con-
sidering the Act's application to the religious fraud area. Compari-
sons between religious fraud and the crimes envisioned by Con-
gress in drafting civil RICO are easy and telling. Although some
commentators point to particular fraud-based crimes, such as se-
curities fraud, as undeserving of the "racketeering" label,'96 reli-
gious fraud clearly is a malum in se crime equal to any imagined
by civil RICO's drafters. The religious racketeer is a particularly
dangerous crime figure; he primarily preys not on businessmen, but
on highly vulnerable and often isolated individuals. In addition to
the financial havoc he reaps, the religious racketeer robs his vic-
tims of moral capital. Any moral or normative distinction between
conventional racketeering and religious racketeering is, if anything,
only one of a lesser compared to a greater.
Civil RICO's sanctioning approach is also relevant to religious
racketeering. A sanction is most useful in areas with expected high
information deficiencies or concealability factors.'97 In order to
have a pricing system, society must be able to calculate accurately
195. See, e.g., Parnon, RICO Damages: Look to the Clayton Act, Not the Predicate Act,
21 CAL. W.L. REV. 348, 362 (1985) (following the Clayton Act would "prevent RICO from
being used as a launching pad for overly 'creative' damage theories, alleged by plaintiffs
seeking recoveries far beyond their injuries and far beyond anything available under pre-
existing law").
196. See Note, RICO and Securities Fraud: A Workable Limitation, 83 CoLum. L. REV.
1513, 1536 (1983); Granelly, Playing for Keeps With State RICO, NAT'L L.J., July 5, 1982, at
1, 8.
197. In a sanctioning system, informational deficiencies are less problematic than they are
in a pricing system because the sanction is simply set high enough to deter all violations.
Moreover, with crimes like racketeering, in which concealability is high, calculating the so-
cial cost of a violation would be meaningless because "the prospective violator will discount
... the punishment cost by [the probability of punishment] in determining the expected
punishment cost for the violation." R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
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the external costs of a particular crime.' 98 In cases of religious
racketeering, the victims often are too isolated, stoic, or simply
confused to make their injuries known through the press or the
courts. Moreover, the true societal costs of a malum in se crime
such as religious racketeering are difficult if not impossible to cal-
culate. What is the real cost to society when a televangelist empire
collapses in scandal? The costs are as incalculable as the benefits
that parishioners seek in joining religious organizations. As in more
conventional racketeering, clearly no price is sufficient to yield an
"efficient" racketeering offense.
Likewise, civil RICO's concept of "private attorneys general" is
essential for any true deterrence of religious racketeers. Because of
the high concealability of this crime, religious racketeering, like its
conventional counterpart, is best deterred by individuals at the
source. Church supporters turned RICO plaintiffs can approach
discovery and trial with a greater initial familiarity with the organ-
ization, as well as far more zeal in pursuing their individual suits.
These private attorneys general, moreover, would be less suscepti-
ble to the type of public pressure that has caused the government
to end its own investigations of religious fraud. 99 Given civil
RICO's many procedural inducements and its penalty-maximizing
structure, private suits against religious racketeers could be sus-
tained in the numbers Congress envisioned when it sought an ef-
fective secondary deterrent. Finally, and possibly most important,
civil RICO's force of "private attorneys general" is a deterrent
without the constitutional problems that inevitably accompany
governmental action. 00 Private suits under civil RICO offer a
223 (1976). A sanctioning system changes this cost-benefit analysis, offsetting the low
probability of detection with the severity of the potential penalty.
198. When society cannot gauge the cost of a violation or even the number of violations
occurring, a sanctioning system generally is superior to a pricing system. Cooter, supra note
186, at 1549-50.
199. See supra notes 116-54 and accompanying text.
200. In Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1139 (D. Mass.
1982), the court in dicta noted that first amendment protection likely would bar the plain-
tiffs' civil RICO claim against the Church of Scientology. This case, however, involved a
broad allegation that the church's literature and general practices were fraudulent. Id. at
1137. Such allegations might raise constitutional problems, although courts regularly make
such inquiries in mail order ministry cases. See supra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
Curiously, the court seemed to suggest that civil RICO should be construed narrowly in
cases involving religious organizations, Van Schaick, 535 F. Supp. at 1139, whereas it ac-
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proven deterrent devoid of church and state complications." 1
B. Religious Racketeering and the Mechanics of a Civil RICO
Action
The potential deterrent value of civil RICO's application to cases
of religious racketeering is best appreciated in terms of the ability
of plaintiffs to translate a religious racketeering situation into an
actual civil RICO suit.202 As was the intention of civil RICO's
drafters, the four basic elements of a civil RICO charge are easily
met and should pose little difficulty in most religious racketeering
cases.
In pursuing a civil RICO claim, a plaintiff first must allege an
injury. In Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 20 3 the United States Su-
preme Court clarified what constitutes an injury under civil RICO.
Rejecting arguments that a plaintiff had to show a "competitive
injury" or a "racketeering injury," the Court defined an injury as
simply "the harm caused by the predicate acts sufficieiitly related
to constitute a pattern."20 4 The injury element thus is determined
largely by the plaintiff's ability to show the predicate offenses and
"pattern of racketeering" elements under civil RICO.
The second civil RICO element is the two predicate offenses re-
quired to constitute a pattern of racketeering.20 5 The civil RICO
statute lists a number of crimes that can constitute a predicate of-
fense under the Act.206 A plaintiff must show that two of these
predicate offenses were committed in the same ten-year period, al-
though the two offenses can be different crimes. The most contro-
cepted that simple allegations of fraudulent representation do not raise similar constitu-
tional problems. Id. at 1140. No basis exists for interpreting civil RICO narrowly in religious
cases as a general rule, since courts generally can confine their review to secular questions.
Cf. Congregation Beth Yitzhok v. Briskman, 566 F. Supp. 555, 558 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (dis-
missing civil RICO counts without prejudice so plaintiffs could "bring an action arising out
of the same incidents after the religious issues in this case have been resolved by the appro-
priate religious tribunal").
201. See supra notes 106-15 and accompanying text.
202. An estimated two percent of civil RICO cases involve religious disputes. ABA RE-
PORT, supra note 170, at 56.
203. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
204. Id. at 497.
205. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982).
206. Id. § 1961(1).
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versial and not coincidentally the most commonly used"' predicate
offenses are mail and wire fraud.20 8 A plaintiff using the mail fraud
predicate would have to show only that the defendant had the in-
tention to defraud and that in furtherance of this deception, he
had sent two separate mailings. 09
The third element of a civil RICO charge is a pattern of racke-
teering. To prove a pattern, a plaintiff must show that the two
predicate acts are related in some way to the racketeering enter-
prise.210 Although courts disagree on how close a nexus is required,
under the most stringent test, the acts must manifest "some com-
mon scheme, plan, or motive and cannot be simply a series of dis-
connected acts."21' Even under this test, the use of the mails to
solicit contributions for a fraudulent purpose would constitute a
common scheme.
The final element of a civil RICO charge is the existence of a
"racketeering enterprise." This is the element that effectively dis-
tinguishes a case of common-law fraud from a fraud-based racke-
teering offense. Although a single individual can constitute an "en-
terprise," a plaintiff must show the existence of an ongoing or
continuous operation that transcends the racketeering activity in a
207. An estimated 44% of civil RICO cases rely solely on allegations of mail or wire fraud.
ABA REPORT, supra note 170, at 57. Of 270 civil RICO cases studied by the ABA, 77% were
based on predicate acts involving fraud. Id. at 56-57. Of these cases, 40% alleged securities
fraud and 37% alleged common-law fraud. Id. Only 9% involved "allegations of criminal
activity of a type generally associated with professional criminals." Id. at 56.
208. One commentator actually waxed poetic in praise of the mail fraud statute:
To federal prosecutors of white collar crime, the mail fraud statute is our
Stradivarius, our Colt 45, our Louisville Slugger, our Cuisinart--and our true
love. We may flirt with RICO, show off with 10b-5, and call the conspiracy law
"darling," but we always come home to the virtues of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1341, with
its simplicity, adaptability, and comfortable familiarity. It understands us and,
like many a foolish spouse, we like to think we understand it.
Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DuQ. L. REv. 771, 771 (1980) (footnotes
omitted).
209. United States v. Fowler, 735 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Kreimer, 609
F.2d 126 (5th Cir. 1980).
210. Project, White Collar Crime: Second Annual Survey of Law, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
173, 355 & n.1434 (1981).
211. Id. at 355 n.1429. Recently the Supreme Court agreed to hear a case that likely will
clarify the pattern requirement. See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 829 F.2d 648
(8th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 56 U.S.L.W. 3647 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1988) (No. 87-1252).
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particular case.212 An organization that engaged in either general or
goal-specific solicitations and then diverted funds to purposes
other than those advertised would meet the enterprise test.
A religious racketeering victim who brings a civil RICO charge is
not normally challenging the basis of the religion or the legitimacy
of a church's actual expenditures. Rather, in solicitation cases, the
victim is simply attacking the use of funds solicited for a purpose
wholly different than that advertised. Civil RICO's structure iso-
lates the strictly secular elements of the violation and focuses on
the promises made, not the legitimacy of the cause.
RICO's ability to structure a claim in purely secular terms is the
Act's most promising feature as an alternative to governmental ac-
tion against religious fraud. Moreover, RICO offers society the
powerful deterrent of knowledgeable, localized "private attorneys
general." Armed with RICO's financial and procedural aids, these
litigants would constitute a continual check on religious organiza-
tions in a way that would be completely impractical for the govern-
ment. Victims could react quickly and effectively after the first
suggestion of impropriety. Once set on the course of litigation,
these disenfranchised individuals would likely surpass all Con-
gress's expectations in their commitment to the suit. If Congress
sought committed private attorneys general, religious racketeering
victims would amply fill the role. Religious racketeers, however,
like other types of racketeers, are not a homogenous group. Some
ministries or religious organizations make only occasional fraudu-
lent or deceptive solicitations whereas others rely more substan-
tially on such practices. Although eradicating all religious racke-
teers clearly is preferable to the present sporadic enforcement,
RICO's blind penalty-maximizing character denies society an easy
method of distinguishing between racketeers and reforming those
ministries and organizations that are only fractionally reliant on
racketeering proceeds. As this Article will demonstrate, distin-
guishing between racketeers is particularly important in the area of
religious fraud.
212. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981). But cf. United States v. Ander-
son, 626 F.2d 1358, 1371-72 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1982).
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C. Substantial Versus Fractional Religious Racketeers: Should
Society Ruin Them All and Let God Sort Them Out?
Since its inception, civil RICO's damages structure has caused
great controversy among both academics and practitioners. Most
criticism of RICO has centered on the wide array of fraudulent
business transactions that can constitute racketeering under the
Act.213 These critics advocate a more narrow definition of the rack-
eteering crime, in essence shrinking RICO's enforcement net.214 Al-
ternatively, a few commentators have argued for changing the
Act's damages formula to lessen the penalties against businesses
targeted under the Act. 215 -Strong arguments, however, can be made
that RICO's wide enforcement net and its penalty-maximizing
structure are some of the Act's greatest assets. 16 If civil RICO has
a fundamental failing, it is not in its capture of large numbers of
racketeers, but in its blind penalty maximization. Clearly, Congress
would want some racketeers ruined under the Act, but others may
deserve less catastrophic measures. The solution lies somewhere in
the middle: capture large numbers of racketeers but ruin only
those who exhibit particularly egregious behavior.
In developing civil RICO's penalty-maximizing scheme, Congress
viewed the racketeer as something of a monolith, irredeemable and
unreformable. This view of the racketeer closely resembled
Cooter's exceptional injurer, a violator who finds paying damages
cheaper than adhering to a community standard.21 The excep-
tional injurer is a person whose intentional or repeated violations
of a social standard are such that the threat of normal damages is
an insufficient incentive to coax him back to the social norm.
The problem with civil RICO's blind penalty-maximizing scheme
is that the Act's sanction is set in response to the most deviant
class. Congress designed civil RICO with the substantial racketeer
in mind; that is, it targeted businesses that are substantially reli-
ant on racketeering proceeds. Because it viewed this exceptional
213. ABA REPORT, supra note 170, at 277-78; Boucher, Closing the RICO Floodgates in
the Aftermath of Sedima, 31 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 133 (1986).
214. ABA REPORT, supra note 170, at 277-80.
215. See, e.g., Parnon, supra note 195.
216. Turley, supra note 17.
217. Cooter, supra note 186, at 1543.
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violator as irredeemable, Congress set its sanctions to ruin rather
than to reform.21 8 This sanction, however, is also used against busi-
nesses that rely on racketeering for only a fraction of their total
proceeds. The result is a sanction that works to ruin fractional
racketeers whose behavior falls close enough to the social norm
that they may be reformable by a smaller penalty. The social cost
of ruining reformable businesses is high and could be avoided eas-
ily if civil RICO could differentiate at the damages stage according
to the degree of reliance on racketeering.
An easy method of differentiation may lie in civil RICO's dam-
age multiplier. Although crude, the treble damages provision offers
an automatic test of racketeering reliance. By awarding damages
equal to treble a racketeer's proceeds from racketeering, the Act
allows only those firms with a fractional reliance on racketeering to
survive the damage award. 19 If a business's income consists pri-
marily of racketeering proceeds, liability for damages three times
those proceeds normally would force the business into insolvency.
Those firms that could not sustain such a loss are precisely the
ones that society would want to ruin as "exceptional injurers." The
gains multiplication approach might prove to be a compromise be-
tween reducing the number of racketeers prosecuted under the Act
and reducing the damages permitted against defendants. By forc-
ing a racketeer to return triple his reliance on ill-gotten gains, soci-
ety could still ruin the exceptional injurer while reforming busi-
nesses closer to the social norm. Because damages are trebled, the
occurrence of an efficient racketeering violator would be unlikely.
This approach has particular promise as applied to religious racke-
218. In enacting civil RICO, Congress stated that the Act's purpose was "the eradication
of organized crime. . . by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the
unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime." Pub. L. No. 91-452, §§ 901-02
(1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. 1I 1985)).
219. A critical factor in this penalizing scheme, of course, is to apply the multiplier to an
accurate estimate of a racketeer's illegal gains-his reliance on racketeering. If, however,
only a few victims sue under civil RICO, this reliance would not be tested adequately. Civil
RICO's promise, however, lies in its case-generating reputation. The promise of treble dam-
ages encourages a large number of suits, either individual or joined. See Wolin v. Hanley
Dawson Cadillac, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 890, 891 (N.D. IIl. 1986) ("RICO's lure of treble dam-
ages and attorney's fees draws litigants and lawyers . . . like lemmings to the sea"). The
rapid consolidation of large groups of litigants in the PTL controversy, for example, is en-
couraging. PTL Faction Is Pushing To Bring Bakkers Back, Times-Picayune, Oct. 13, 1987,
at A-5.
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teering because society may value the opportunity to reform frac-
tional religious racketeers.
D. Focused Penalty Maximization: The Gains Multiplication
Approach Applied to Cases of Religious Racketeering
The gains multiplication approach strives to eliminate the ineffi-
ciency and wastefulness of blind penalty maximization under civil
RICO. Although substantial violators are properly subjected to
penalty maximization, the gains multiplication approach assumes
that fractional racketeers can and should be reformed rather than
ruined. The gains multiplication approach achieves this balance
through focused penalty maximization, trebling reliance-based
damages to ruin substantial racketeers while forcing fractional
racketeers back to the social norm. The distinction is important in
areas such as religious racketeering, in which defendant organiza-
tions will often be fractional racketeers with legitimate religious or
charitable purposes. Moreover, because of their normally high op-
erating costs and limited revenue base, religious organizations are
particularly vulnerable to penalty maximization under the Act.
The ruination of most such organizations serves little purpose be-
cause, unlike the substantial racketeer, these organizations can be
coaxed back to the social norm with reasonable penalties. By ap-
plying blind penalty maximization in this area, society would suc-
ceed only in eliminating organizations with primarily charitable,
socially advantageous purposes.
The ongoing PTL controversy may offer some interesting in-
sights into the potential costs of penalty maximization in the reli-
gious area. Although it is not clear whether Bakker and his associ-
ates committed any racketeering violations, PTL's scandal-induced
financial crisis exemplifies the extreme vulnerability of large reli-
gious ministries to legal and public pressures.2 0 Before Bakker's
1980 tryst with a young church secretary became public knowledge,
the PTL empire was a televangelist fantasy come true. The PTL
network reached a reported 13.5 million households daily and
broadcasted over 178 local stations.2 2' PTL's legendary Christian
220. Merida, supra note 150, at 3A, col. 1 (reporting the testimony of televangelists before
the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Oversight).
221. Ostling, supra note 6, at 62.
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theme park, Heritage U.S.A., drew more than six million vacation-
ers in 1986.222 PTL's financial outlook today, however, is far from
robust. After the Bakkers handed over control of their $129-mil-
lion-a-year ministry to fundamentalist Jerry Falwell, the PTL em-
pire began to unravel. 2 Faced with a $72-million debt and plum-
meting contribution levels, Falwell was ultimately forced to place
PTL in chapter 11 bankruptcy.224
PTL's bankruptcy demonstrates how susceptible a large
televangelist organization is to a short-term loss of contributions.2
Even with the steady influx of profits from Heritage U.S.A. and
the PTL Network, PTL could not long remain solvent in a busi-
ness in which seventy-five percent of contributions may be com-
mitted to television production costs. 226 Although PTL's financial
woes may have been worsened by poor management under the
Bakkers, other large televangelist organizations display similar fi-
nancial fragility.227 Blind penalty maximization in this area would
exact a considerable toll. The ruination of organizations such as
PTL would serve few societal interests. Given the reliance of a
televangelist organization on contributions, the organization clearly
is reformable under continued public pressure and scrutiny. More-
222. Id.
223. There is some disagreement over how Falwell got control of PTL; the Bakkers insist
that Falwell "stole" the organization. Craig, supra note 35, at 16A, col. 2. See also Adler &
Carroll, Jim and Tammy Rise Again, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 19, 1987, at 77 (reporting accusations
that Falwell's "plan all along has been to let PTL fail and then pick up its valuable satellite
network at a distress-sale price"). Regardless of how or why he acquired PTL, Falwell inher-
ited an organization with serious overcommitment and underfunding problems. Craig, supra
note 36, at 16A, col. 2. On October 8, 1987, Falwell and his entire PTL board resigned after
an unfavorable ruling by the bankruptcy judge. Id. at 1A.
224. In October 1987, PTL had up to $72 million in debts and $180,000 in the bank.
Bakkers' Return Far Off, Houston Post, Oct. 14, 1987, at 11A.
225. The impact of public scandal on television ministries is immediate. Following the
PTL revelations, at least three top televangelists experienced a drop in viewers, with Swag-
gart losing roughly 400,000, Schuller 191,000, and Roberts 155,000. Ostling, supra note 60, at
51.
226. Johnston & Leonard, supra note 3, at 3, col. 1. Falwell reportedly spends $5 on tele-
vision costs for every $7 he raises; in comparison, the United Methodist Church spends only
50 for every $1. Galloway, supra note 74, § 5, at 7.
227. Falwell's own television ministry is facing financial problems. Recently, Falwell had
to take his Old Time Gospel Hour off 50 television stations because of funding problems.
Craig, supra note 35, at 16A, col. 2. Both Falwell and Oral Roberts have had serious finan-
cial problems in the past. See supra notes 38, 41.
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over, even PTL's most severe critics would not be able to portray
the organization as an enterprise relying substantially on racke-
teering proceeds. If all of the allegations of solicitation fraud were
proven against the Bakkers, racketeering proceeds still would not
be significant in comparison to the organization's annual $129-mil-
lion revenue base.228
The impact that a shift from harm-oriented to gain-oriented
measurement would have on religious racketeering cases would
vary radically with the nature of the racketeering enterprise. For
purposes of analysis, civil RICO cases can be broken down into
four principal groups: cases in which racketeering gains are less
than the harm inflicted, cases in which the gains equal the harm
inflicted, cases in which gains are difficult or impossible to gauge,
and cases in which the gains are greater than the harm. This Arti-
cle analyzes each of these groups separately in terms of what im-
pact, if any, a shift to a gain-oriented measurement would have on
actual damage awards under RICO.
The first case group encompasses those situations in which rack-
eteering gains are less than the harm inflicted. In common cases of
religious solicitation fraud, the racketeering injury-the dona-
tion-usually will equal the racketeering gain. However, variations
are possible. Consider, for example, a racketeer whose organization
was deceptively named to resemble a legitimate religious group.
Assume that this racketeer was successful in diverting $30,000 of
contributions to his organization, so successful in fact that the le-
gitimate church was left with few contributions and was forced to
close. As a result, this church might incur extensive real estate and
administrative losses. If these losses amounted to $1,000,000, the
church could sue the racketeer for the entire amount of the losses,
alleging that it was the intended beneficiary of the diverted contri-
butions. Assuming that the church can show standing and all the
necessary elements under civil RICO, its potential damages under
the present Act would be $3,000,000 plus attorney costs.229 This
228. PTL's annual profits have been reported as high as $179 million. Adler & Carroll,
supra note 224, at 77.
229. Because the racketeer defrauded the church's congregation rather than the church
itself, a fraud action might be problematic in this situation. Nevertheless, similar accusa-
tions have been made against existing religious organizations, with one case ending in an
apparent settlement. Cf. Cebu Ass'n of California, Inc. v. Santo Nino de Cebu Ass'n of USA,
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sum would be three times the damages that it can show were the
result of the racketeer's predicate acts of fraud.
Conversely, under the gains multiplication approach, the poten-
tial damage award would be $90,000 plus costs-a considerable dif-
ference. This difference will mean little if the defendant is a sub-
stantial racketeer, because either damage figure likely would force
him into insolvency. If the defendant is a fractional racketeer,
however, the difference might be critical. A fractional racketeer
might be able to sustain a $90,000 loss because, by definition, he
has other, legitimate sources of revenue. A $3,000,000 loss, on the
other hand, would leave few fractional racketeering businesses
solvent.
The PTL controversy may offer a current example of alleged
racketeering in this first case group. Although the Bakkers have
never been formally charged with fraud or racketeering, the news-
papers have carried allegations that, if proven, might involve rack-
eteering injuries that are greater than the racketeer's alleged gain.
Falwell has charged that under the Bakkers' management, PTL
systematically overcommitted Heritage U.S.A. under the PTL's
Lifetime Partners program.2 30 For a $1000 donation to PTL, life-
time partners were promised three nights free lodging a year for
life at the Christian theme park. Many PTL followers actually pur-
chased multiple lifetime partnerships. In 1987, however, Falwell
announced that PTL could not honor its commitment under the
partnership program because of huge overbookings by the
Bakkers2 1
If Falwell's accusations were ever proven in a civil RICO action,
lifetime members might be able to collect treble their injuries,
which could conceivably include travel and lodging costs incurred
after being turned away at Heritage U.S.A. Yet PTL never re-
ceived the money lost by lifetime members after their registration
95 Cal. App. 3d 129, 157 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1979) (rejecting injunctive relief to stop the use of a
similar sounding religious name in solicitations).
230. PTL has a reported 114,000 lifetime partners, many of whom are thought to be
fiercely loyal to the Bakkers. Adler & Carroll, supra note 224, at 77. In fact, Falwell quit
PTL after a bankruptcy judge cleared the way to allow lifetime partners to take four of the
nine seats on the PTL Board, a move Falwell insisted would insure the return of the Bak-
kers. Id.
231. Craig, supra note 36, at 16A, col. 2.
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in the program. Any damages based on this larger figure, therefore,
would be unrelated to the degree of PTL's reliance on fraudulent
solicitation through this program. Under the gains multiplication
approach, these collateral losses would be left to conventional con-
tract or tort remedies and would not be included in the baseline
figure to be trebled. In this first group of cases, damages under the
present Act and under the gains multiplication approach therefore
would be different, with overall lower damages for plaintiffs under
the gains multiplication theory.
In the second group of cases, the difference between standard
RICO and the gains multiplication approach is less pronounced.
This group encompasses those situations in which the harm is
equal to the gain derived from a racketeering enterprise. In most
cases of solicitation fraud, a goal-specific contribution is made to
an organization to support a specific cause. If the organization then
uses the funds for questionable or personal uses, the contributor's
injury is confined to the amount of the contribution, as is the rack-
eteer's gain. Under both the present Act and the gains multiplica-
tion approach, therefore, damages would be the same. For a
$30,000 contribution, a plaintiff potentially could receive $90,000
plus costs, or treble the losses (and the racketeer's gain) under the
racketeering scheme.2 32
A similar result is reached in the third case group, in which gain
is difficult or impossible to gauge. When an organization faces fi-
nancial problems, it might choose to divert money earmarked for
mission work to its national organization to prevent more costly
measures, such as high-interest loans. Even if allegations of such
activity were proven, however, it would be impossible to gauge how
much the organization had benefitted from the alleged fraudulent
enterprise. The actual damages probably would be limited to the
dollar amount of the misused contributions. The amount lost by
the contributors and that gained by the organization being the
232. A New York civil RICO case, dismissed for lack of justiciability, presented a poten-
tial example in this category. In Congregation Beth Yitzhok v. Briskman, 566 F. Supp. 555
(E.D.N.Y. 1983), one Hassidic sect accused another of racketeering in an attempt to take
over a congregation. Had the plaintiffs proven damages, the likely ultimate figure based on
gains would have been identical to the estimate of racketeering harm. Many of the earlier
examples of fraudulent religious solicitation would fall into this category.
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same, the plaintiffs would receive the same damages under either
damage approach.
A shift to gain-oriented measurement of damages would be criti-
cal, however, in the last case group, in which racketeering gains are
greater than the harm inflicted. This situation will occur whenever
ministries use solicitation money for other, assignable capital-gen-
erating enterprises.
A fraudulent real estate transaction would be a typical case.
Suppose that after defrauding thousands of contributors, a racket-
eer bought, among other things, a condominium. Assume that this
condominium cost $700,000 in 1980, all the money coming from
mission funds. If the contributors prove all the elements of a civil
RICO action, they would be entitled to their damages, $700,000.
The gains from racketeering, however, might be considerably more.
With careful planning, the racketeer could sell the property for
$1,000,000 or even $1,400,000. Yet, under the present damage mea-
surement approach, the plaintiffs would be entitled only to treble
the percentage of their contributions that went to the real estate
venture. If the plaintiffs collectively contributed $30,000 to the real
estate scheme, then their damages under RICO would be $90,000,
plus attorney's fees and other litigation costs.
Under the gains multiplication approach, however, the plaintiffs'
contributions to the real estate venture would be adjusted before
trebling. For example, if the racketeer realized a twenty-percent
profit on the initial $700,000 investment, each dollar contributed
by the plaintiffs would be increased by twenty percent, or by the
appropriate amount adjusted for the date of the contribution. This
adjusted figure would then be trebled, resulting in a higher damage
figure and a more accurate measurement of the racketeer's alleged
reliance on racketeering. 23 3
In a large religious organization, which might have various racke-
teering schemes, the particular damages in any given scheme might
233. Had civil RICO been alleged, the damages in the case of The Bible Speaks would
have presented a possible example of racketeering gains outweighing racketeering harm. In
re The Bible Speaks, 73 B.R. 848 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987), aff'd sub nom The Bible Speaks v.
Dovydenas, 81 B.R. 750 (D. Mass. 1988), Reverend Carl Stevens was found to have methodi-
cally deceived a wealth devotee into giving the church $6.6 million in donations. Among the
possessions acquired by Stevens was a $120,000 Palm Beach condominium and a swimming
pool. Fischer, supra note 2, at A10, col. 5.
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fall into any of these four case groups. Nevertheless, the overall
result would be a figure based ostensibly on racketeering profits,
although this figure often will equal the racketeering harm. In the
first case group, in which racketeering harm outweighs racketeer-
ing gains, damages tend to be lower under the gains multiplication
approach, with collateral losses recoverable under traditional con-
tract and tort damages. Under the second and third case groups, in
which racketeering gains are equal to racketeering harm or are dif-
ficult to gauge, the damages will vary little between the two ap-
proaches. Finally, under the last case group, in which racketeering
gains are greater than racketeering harm, plaintiffs will actually re-
ceive more damages under the gains multiplication approach.
Overall, plaintiffs likely will receive more damages under the gains
multiplication approach because the fourth case group probably is
more common than the first. More importantly, however, by ad-
justing the damages allowed in both these case groups, society fo-
cuses civil RICO's penalty-maximizing system on reliance-based
figures. By trebling a racketeer's gains, society can test the racket-
eer's reliance on these gains and thus weed out those ministries
most reliant on defrauding the faithful.
V. CONCLUSION
In the United States, religious racketeering makes good financial
sense. In 1984, individual Americans donated $59 billion to chari-
ties.234 With an estimated nine percent of the country's privately
owned wealth and more than eight million employees, charitable
organizations represent a major financial market in this country.28 5
Although thirty-eight states require annual reporting for charities
in their fund-raising drives, all current state regulations specifically
exempt religious organizations from the mandatory reporting re-
quirements.3 8 Whether soliciting contributions for the general
support of a ministry or for a relief program in the Third World,
religious groups operate in a market with virtually unlimited po-
234. Johnston & Leonard, supra note 3, at 3, col. 1 (citing report by Independent Sector).
235. In 1984 charities in the United States were estimated to have $202 billion in reve-
nues coming from various corporate, public, and private funds. Id.
236. Sontag, supra note 25, at 52, col. 2.
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tential donations and almost no governmental supervision of any
kind.
Many religious leaders have found this temptation too much to
resist. Possibly hundreds of millions of dollars are collected annu-
ally by religious groups for purposes different from those adver-
tised on radio and television. 3 Contributions raised for a particu-
lar child in Thailand, for example, may go for general ministry
costs, for a real estate venture, or even for the personal enrichment
of the minister. The assortment of private and governmental reme-
dies for such fraudulent solicitation, when successful, fall far short
of an adequate deterrent.2 38 Because no state specifically regulates
religious charities as charitable organizations, private citizens must
rely on collateral remedies, such as suits for breach of fiduciary
duties. 239 Although private citizens have sued religious organiza-
tions successfully, these suits often involve clear contract, tort, and
other grounds that are not present in most fraudulent solicitation
cases.240 Moreover, private suits remain a rarity because of the lack
of incentive for private citizens to shoulder the responsibilities of
long litigation. Derivative lawsuits and other remedies will most
often result in a remedy for the organization as a whole and not for
the individual plaintiff.24
Similarly, governmental suits have proven of limited value
against religious fraud. 42 The two agencies most active in the area,
the FCC and the IRS, have limited jurisdiction and administrative
capabilities in combating religious racketeers. The FCC has inves-
tigated only a handful of religious groups, and the only instance of
a license revocation was the result of a penalty entirely separate
from the charges of fraudulent solicitation. 24 3 Even in that case,
the television ministry simply began broadcasting on an alternative
237. Interestingly, Jimmy Swaggart, himself a target of financial investigations, recently
gave his own unique view of misappropriations of church funds. Swaggart estimated that
"50 to 75 percent of all monies donated to 'religious' activities are totally wasted!... Not
only are they misdirected, but in many cases they actually go to aid and abet the work of
Satan." Applebome, supra note 46, at 10, col. 1.
238. See supra notes 94-154 and accompanying text.
239. Comment, supra note 21, at 1212.
240. See supra notes 106-14 and accompanying text.
241. Comment, supra note 21, at 1211.
242. See supra notes 116-154 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 116-23 and accompanying text.
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station.244 The IRS has had more success prosecuting religious
groups but has often concentrated on mail order and fringe
churches 245 rather than the larger, politically powerful televangelist
ministries. Neither the FCC nor the IRS, moreover, investigates
cases of religious fraud in nearly the numbers or frequency needed
to serve as a deterrent for the entire market.
The volatile legal and political issues raised by governmental in-
volvement in the operation of religious groups further frustrate
state and federal prosecutions. The Supreme Court has struck
down a number of statutes requiring mandatory reporting based
on the source of the church's funds as violative of the establish-
ment clause of the first amendment. 4 The public, moreover, has
halted past state investigations into alleged religious fraud and has
even stripped state officials of authority to move against religious
groups in some cases of alleged church financial misconduct.247
Federal agencies also have been chastised for their prosecutions of
religious groups.24 This traditional opposition to even minimal
governmental involvement has made officials leery of any signifi-
cant prosecutions of mainstream or large religious groups without a
clear mandate from the legislatures.
Civil RICO could prove the answer to private and governmental
problems in prosecuting fraudulent religious groups. Under RICO,
private groups would have ample incentives to bring suit against
ministers and religious organizations engaging in fraudulent prac-
tices. If successful, these private attorneys general would receive
treble damages as well as their attorney's fees and other litigation
costs. Their chances of being successful are increased by RICO's
low standard of proof and liberal definition of racketeering. These
incentives are part of RICO's underlying agenda to ruin racketeers
through private litigation. In economic terms, RICO establishes a
high enough prize to support high litigation costs through rent-
seeking behavior.2 49
244. See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 127-44 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 95-105 and accompanying text.
247. See Comment, supra note 21, at 1208-09 n.18.
248. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 173-89 and accompanying text.
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Civil RICO likewise would eliminate the need for governmental
action and its constitutional and political complications. As in the
environmental and antitrust fields, private attorneys general would
supply the necessary deterrent and supervision of the market with-
out governmental intervention. Moreover, unlike governmental in-
vestigations, citizen suits might be brought more quickly, thereby
publicizing and possibly precluding further fraudulent solicita-
tions. Finally, citizen suits could be brought in the numbers neces-
sary for an effective deterrent, a rate of prosecution probably be-
yond the capabilities of most state and federal agencies.
The prosecution of religious racketeers, however, also illustrates
some flaws in the current method of measuring the harm rather
than the gains produced by a racketeering enterprise. RICO cre-
ates a perverse incentive for racketeering victims to prolong a vio-
lation in pursuit of higher treble damages.250 Harm-oriented dam-
ages also fail to allow any real differentiation between fractional
and substantial racketeers based on their reliance on racketeering
proceeds. The gains multiplication approach would allow society to
differentiate between the substantial and fractional racketeer. By
trebling gains, the racketeer's own reliance on racketeering will de-
termine whether the sanction will be fatal.25' Thus, religious racke-
teers who make a profit from fraudulently solicited funds would be
tested according to their actual gains from a racketeering offense
and not the initial harm it produced. Moreover, in the area of reli-
gious fraud, the shift to gains-oriented damages would not result in
damages any lower than are presently awarded. The gains multipli-
cation approach would serve only to increase the baseline for treb-
ling in cases in which plaintiffs could show a profit beyond the ini-
tial fraudulent solicitation.
Regardless of the measurement used, civil RICO is a promising
and largely unexplored avenue for victims of religious racketeering.
RICO's application to cases of religious fraud, however, would
yield benefits far beyond those received by the individual victims.
The costs of religious fraud to society are not limited to the loss of
possibly hundreds of millions of charity dollars annually. The true
costs are incurred by every legitimate religious and charitable or-
250. See supra notes 180-83 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
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ganization as well as by the system that guarantees their freedom
from governmental interference. Through religious skulduggery
and racketeering, religious freedoms become little more than glori-
fied tax shelters and profit schemes for the unscrupulous. It may
turn out that RICO's greatest service to the country is in prosecut-
ing ministers, not mobsters. Should this prove to be the case, soci-
ety may yet see Peter's prophecy fulfilled:
[T]here were false prophets... who privily shall bring in dam-
nable heresies .... And through covetousness shall they with
feigned words make merchandise of you: whose judgment now of
a long time lingereth not, and their damnation slumbereth
not .... [They] speak evil of the things that they understand
not; and shall utterly perish in their own corruption .... 252
252. 2 Peter 2:1, 3, 12 (King James).
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